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Abstract
Furthering equity as an achievable public policy objective is based on the
ability to assess needs accurately, and distribute resources accordingly.
The purpose of this paper is to plot the development of the formulae
governing resource allocation in education, health and social housing
and to chart their course as a tool with which governments attempted to
achieve various objectives.
The paper begins by suggesting that allocation systems can be
explained through a form of public choice theory. Having made this
proposal it then charts the development of needs based resource
allocation from its origin in the nineteenth century, when Sidney Webb
set guiding principles, through the pre and post Second World war
period, and into the major flowering of needs based formulae since 1970.
As a result there is an assessment of the rationale used in needs
based formulae during a period when resources are constrained and
attempts are made to push allocation even further down and apply the
formulae to smaller units.
The conclusion focuses on equity as the single objective that
remains consistent throughout the development of over a century of
funding formulae. Yet, in a dynamic environment many forces affect the
final design of allocation formulae. Intellectual, political and technical
reasons interact with concepts of fairness and equity, assessments of
priorities and need, the aspiration of budgetary restraint and efficiency,
and the control of provision in order to explain former and current
allocation systems.
1Introduction
Contemporary education, health and housing policy seem almost
inevitably to be governed by finance. Fiscal constraints, real or
imagined, determine what governments can spend on social policy
while the way in which these budgets are spent determine how, where
and on whom the benefits are bestowed. Crude expenditure levels or
even efficiency never have been the sole measures of successful
provision. Access by different social groups and equity issues have
always been an important part of social policy debate. This study is
concerned with one strand of that debate – area based equity or
‘territorial justice’ as one leading authority called it (Davies 1968).
The following historical account will concentrate on the education,
health and housing sectors. The focus will be on explaining the
development of contemporary funding formulae. In any historical study
that is used as a precursor to the analysis of current systems it is
important not to extrapolate backwards contemporary values into
periods and schemes that were formed in very different conditions to
that which exist today. Nevertheless one of the central questions is
whether there is any common thread to the evolution these allocation
mechanisms and what has driven it. In the most recent past there have
developed a series of quite complicated mathematically based funding
formulae that underpin the allocation of funds to health services,
housing, education and local government more generally. They are all
based on some concept of need. This is a fundamentally non-market, not
to say socialistic concept (Doyal and Gough 1991). How did it come to
prominence during a long period of Conservative, profoundly anti
market, rule? Why should a mathematical formulation, beyond most
electors understanding, gain such sway?
In this study we concentrate on education, health and housing as
exemplars of service funding issues. Why? All three are in kind services
administered by local agencies. Rights to benefit are not based on
individual claims to a nationally set entitlement, as is the case with social
security. Area based claims of some kind have to be judged. More
recently each service has been the subject of quasi–market reform and
the devolution of budgets to lower levels of service delivery (Le Grand,
Glennerster and Maynard 1991; Hills 1990). This poses new problems of
micro resource allocation. One of the themes that will emerge is that
many of the same issues, problems and solutions periodically re-occur.
Though each service system has distinctive relationships with the central
2state all three also show similarities in the changing approaches
governments have adopted over time. Why should this be?
We begin by postulating a theory that might answer some of these
questions and explain the evolution of formula funding mechanisms.
A crude stage theory for the development of funding
formulae
In all the three services we are considering the state only came to be a
major provider during the course of this century and a prime actor only
after the Second World War. Housing is still predominantly provided by
the private sector though government has been a prime mover in the tax
and regulation of the private market. It turns out that the early history of
service funding tells us a great deal about the forms we have today
(Glennerster 1996).
The reason why the state and, in the UK especially, the central
state, came to evolve into such a major source of funding for these
services has been the subject of much debate that we shall not re-run
here (see for example Foster, Jackman and Perlman 1980). However,
given that development major questions arise about how the central
government should perform its rationing role. Should it provide
matching grants to reward local initiative, base its allocations on some
equity rule or reward the government’s political friends? All would be, a
priori, rational strategies. The Foster et al (op cit) account relies primarily
on agency theory to explain developments. The UK is a unitary state.
Central government may therefore be expected to act as the
headquarters of a firm might do, using its subordinate levels of
administration to carry out its will effectively – minimising transaction
costs and maximising control. Funding mechanisms should be designed
to achieve this and to maximise incentives for agents of central
government to act in an efficient manner. Yet this perspective does not
convincingly explain the dramatic changes funding systems have gone
through in the past 100 years and especially in the last twenty. We
postulate and then consider an approach that owes more to a modified
form of public choice theory (Mueller 1989; Dunleavy 1991). This
alternative stage theory is outlined in figure 1 below. If we take as our
starting point that services and their funding mechanisms respond to the
varied self interests of voters, politicians and public bureaucrats a crude
stage theory of funding mechanisms can be put together.
3Given the extended franchise in the late nineteenth century, a
range of voters with a new set of interests became part of the electoral
game. They and public bureaucrats had an interest in extending the
boundaries of the state services we are concerned with here (see, for
example, West 1975). We do not suggest this is the whole story but, in so
far as politicians and central bureaucrats see it is in their interests to
expand local services, we would expect the grant mechanisms they
devise to be largely devoted to extending the scope and access to these
services. It may, however, be that Civil Servants are less opportunistic
and motivated by self interest than this model would suggest, and that
many work within a moral framework in which they view well
managed public services as integral to creating a better society. In either
case the aim will be to expand service activity into previously virgin
territory. This is not inconsistent with national politicians and the
electorate having some notion of a basic national minimum standard of
provision. We find this view articulated in the socio-political writings of
individuals like Sidney Webb, who, as we intend to highlight, expressed
many of the principles upon which future reform was to take place. This
context may be called stage one.
State funding does not entail state provision. Service provision
may begin with state support of the existing private agencies, go on to
fund state and private providers equally then, as public provision
expands it may be given preferential support.
Once state services have been firmly established in a
comprehensive, if not uniform, fashion political concern will change to
mechanisms that will achieve the maximum share of the incremental
budget for local interests. This may be called stage two. In a political
system characterised by a strong legislature and locally based politicians
this process will come to be dominated by “log rolling” (or
backscratching), lobbying and temporary coalitions (Wildavsky 1975).
However, in a political system characterised by a strong national party
system, a powerful executive and a unitary state the outcome will be
different. It will be in the interests of the national parties to minimise
public conflict about territorial budget disputes. Such open divisions
will bring the national party into disrepute and weaken party discipline.
Party politicians will be expected to search for rules of the game that
internalise and formalise disputes about area allocations. They will not
wish to rule out local political influence but minimise its capacity to
produce external dispute. External validation and agreement on the
rules of the game will be helpful.
4For bureaucrats the problems are different but the solution may be
the same. For budget allocations to be determined politically by log
rolling or local deals with central politicians deprives them of power and
influence. The more technical the solution the more power they wield
and the more work they have to do.
During stage one (see figure 1), when service provision was only
partial, debate on priorities will tend to centre on which new groups or
areas should be brought into the system. This will reflect area based
interests, and judgements about the existing service base will tend to be
a largely subjective or political judgement. This stage can be
characterised by incremental legislation extending the scope of the
service. Basic legislation in stage two is more stable and increments
become the focus of interest.
Once budgets become very tight as voter resistance to high taxes
grows, regular budget increments cease, so the scale and costs of
disputes will tend to rise. Instead of basking in the glory of additional
funds central politicians will be responsible for allocating cuts or
resisting significant additions. This has been the basis of allocations in
health since 1976. In figure 1 below, this is stage three. Two strategies
may minimise these political costs – first, more technical solutions to the
allocation process and second, devolved responsibility for budgets to
smaller non- political units – schools, GPs, housing associations.
All of this will be much more acceptable if it is done within a
normative framework that is widely accepted – geographical ‘equity’,
fairness or ‘need’. These are all widely accepted in the abstract but have
ambiguous meanings (Doyal and Gough 1991).
Another incentive will be for politicians to try to get more services
from any given pound of tax. Thus formulae may come to be used to
encourage efficiency and prevent manipulation and perverse outcomes.
The tasks these formulae will be asked to perform thus become more
complex. They must minimise the conflict that derives from a tight
budget and rising expectations. They must be capable of devolution to
much smaller units where ordinary people or front line professionals
will come in direct contact with them. They must encourage efficiency.
They may be being asked to do too much.
In what follows we examine the history of formula funding
through each of these supposed stages to see how far this framework of
explanation and sequence can be sustained.
5Public Sector growth
restrained- greater potential
conflict, mixed economy of
welfare, devolved budgets
Sustained incremental
growth- increased
concern with minimising
political cost of allocation
Extensive public provision
established- public
sector dominant.
Extension of provision
through public sector
providers.
Extension of provision.
No preference of provider.
Encourage provision,
mainly through support
of the private sector.
Stage
2
Stage 1
Stage
3
Figure 1: Stage theory structure of an historical analysis of
education, health and housing funding formulae
6Stage 1: The genesis of funding formulae: allocating limited
resource to enable provision.
The extension of provision…
In the stage theory outlined above stage one represented the extension of
service provision up to the point where public resources are mainly
spent on state provision. Studies on welfare state finance have
suggested, broadly speaking, that the pace and means of this
development can be controlled in one of three ways (Glennerster 1996).
These are regulation by (1) legislation, (2) hierarchical/management
control, or, (3) financial arrangements. Legislation covers the statutory
powers granted to ensure provision. Statutes define what providers at
every level (e.g. Ministers of state, local authorities, and street level
providers) are allowed to do. Legal action can then be taken if any one in
the chain of provision exceeds their authority, or does not adequately
fulfil their obligations. Hierarchical powers cover the bureaucratic
means by which central government can influence provision. This
category would include inspection, audit, and ministerial guidance. The
third central government lever is finance. This chiefly includes the
funding mechanisms that govern the allocation of resources. These may
be unit grants, grants linked to performance, percentage or matching
grants, general revenue enhancement or needs based grants. Each of
these three levers is used in tandem, and the development of funding
formulae has often been a response to legislative and hierarchical
developments. This was particularly the case in stage one.
…through private provision.
Early government intervention in education was both small and
governed by a belief that the provision should take place through
private institutions. On this basis the first state grant to education was
made in 1833. £20,000 was given to two national voluntary bodies – the
National Society (Church of England) and the British and Foreign
Schools Society (Nonconformist church body) – to build new schools,
but was only designed to cover only fifty percent of the projects’ costs.
Although the allocation of this grant was at the discretion of the Privy
Council it did favour projects which intended to provide at least 400
places (Godson 1966). Those receiving state finance would also be
required to open up their schools to Her Majesty’s Inspectors (HMIs),
7who were first appointed in 1835, and who were directly accountable to
the Privy Council.
Expenditure by, and the influence of, central government grew
steadily throughout the 1830s, 40s and 50s. In 1843, for example, the
central government supported expenditure on homes for teachers, their
salary and pension costs, as well as school equipment and furniture.
After 1846 grants from central government also covered teacher-training
costs, which were awarded directly to teachers. Capitation payments
were used for the first time in the education sector in 1853. Officials
believed that flat-rate per-pupil funding promoted efficiency and
economy, whereas its strong relationship to local need can only be a post
hoc rationalisation. Qualification for this money continued to depend on
the recommendation of government inspectors who then influenced the
form and content of teaching, which meant that ‘the central government
had acquired a degree of control over the internal workings of the
schools, which was never to be equalled again, despite the fact that they
were private institutions’ (Glennerster 1977).
Despite a modest role for capitation based allocation the majority
of resources were still allocated through a proliferation of specific
percentage grants by the time the Report on the State of Popular Education
was published in 1861. Complexity was becoming a major issue, and the
priority was to find a simpler system of funding. The solution proposed
by the Report formed the basis of the Government’s Revised Code of
Regulations in 1862, which established a funding formula based on a
capitation grant that combined payment-by-results with an attendance
feature. In time it was thought that this would replace the need for Her
Majesty’s Inspectors. Distributing revenue spending in this way
survived more or less unchanged until 1895. Though the state Boards of
Education became additional state suppliers of elementary education
from 1870. The result was a rapid extension in the coverage of
Elementary education so that it could become compulsory in the 1890s.
Hospitals and health care had existed in England since Medieval
times, and great strides had been made in establishing medicine as a
reputable and regulated profession during the course of the nineteenth
century (Abel-Smith 1964). During the same period state financed health
care was strictly limited to the provision of destitute paupers through
the Poor Law. However, the rapid growth of voluntary hospitals and
private practices occurred without state financial or legislative support.
Within this system the state workhouse system became the providers of
last resort for the very poor or terminally ill, and the voluntary societies
8had little need for state assistance in their finances before the 1920s
(Abel-Smith 1964).
The health sector that developed within the framework outlined
above had very little to do with equity of access. Indeed an inverse
relationship between need and provision arose. Doctors and hospitals
were located in the prosperous areas that could maintain and pay for
their services, whereas areas of social deprivation where ill health was
prevalent simply could not afford to pay for such an infrastructure or
service. This was the case for both voluntary hospitals and for General
Practitioners, but given that GPs were the gatekeepers to specialists
working in hospitals, limited access to a GP was a double concern.
These issues, raised by the contemporary profession, the trade
unions, and other sectional interests such as the insurance companies,
led to the introduction in 1911 of the National Insurance Bill. The details
included an insurance scheme under which contributions were to be
made by the individual, the employer and the government. At its
inception in 1913 the scheme was compulsory for all manual and other
workers who earned less than £160 per annum, and ensured cash
benefits paid during periods of sickness, full and free GP care, and
limited pharmaceutical benefits. The BMA originally objected to many of
the financial and administrative provisions in the Act, but was careful
not to push their case too far (BMA 1970). Lloyd George played on the
fears of voluntary hospitals that Government grants would lead to
government control, and that for GPs, that National Insurance was a
means of preserving not eroding their independence (Abel-Smith 1964).
1911, therefore, was an Act that brought most general practitioners into
a relationship of dependence upon state finance, whilst leaving the
hospital system much as it was before. Although the provision of
secondary care was to change radically within forty years, the 1911
National Insurance Act defined the form of GP finance that essentially
lasted the remainder of the century. These independent agents were set
a basic per capita sum to look after individuals accepted onto their ‘list’.
Even in the most recent studies primary care is still defined, quite
correctly as provided by private/independent practitioners, funded
through public resources (Burchardt 1997), though the 1997 Primary
Care Act did, for the first time, introduce a category of salaried GPs as
an alternative means of provision.
By 1938 forty-three per cent of the population were covered by the
scheme and ninety per cent of all GPs had accepted a panel (list) of
national insurance patients (Webster 1988). More than a third of their
income came from the Insurance Fund, although it was stated that two-
9thirds of their time was spent dealing with insured patients (Stevens
1966). However, NI still did not cover many of those groups excluded
from the ‘clubs’, which were the forerunners of NI, or cover treatment
by specialists in voluntary hospitals. This gap was closed with the
foundation of the National Health Service in 1948. Yet it is important to
remember that despite the universal coverage now guaranteed by
legislation, and the use of general taxation to fund part of the service,
GPs remained independent. Their basic relationship with the state did
not change with the foundation of the NHS, even though financially
they may have become more dependent on the public resources. Unlike
the secondary sector, which is directly accountable to and controlled by
the Minister of State, GPs largely remain contracted parties – not direct
employees.
Statutory responsibility within the 1946 National Health Act for
determining the number of practices in an area was handed to the
Medical Practices Committee (MPC). This was a form of self-
government for the service, with legislation (Section 34(2), 1946)
requiring the Committee to ‘secure that the number of medical
practitioners undertaking to provide general medical services in the area
of different Executive Councils or in different parts of those areas are
adequate’ (MPC 1949). In 1949 the Committee responded to the calls for
a more equal dispersal of new doctors by classifying each district in
England and Wales as ‘needy’, ‘open’, ‘doubtful’, or ‘closed’. The
classification appears to be based on the average list sizes within
districts, with qualification for needy areas being average list sizes of
3,000 or more. In 1952, following the publication of GMSC concerns
questioning whether this level was too high the MPC lowered its limit to
2,500, where it has remained more or less unchanged ever since (Butler
1980).
Despite the introduction of incentive payments such as the Initial
Practice Allowance, which gave financial incentives for new doctors to
locate in ‘needy’ areas, their power remains one of negative direction.
Essentially, over the past 100 years the GMSC has aimed to limit or
abolish competition between GPs, and to achieve, what is in essence,
local cartelisation. In practice this has meant that the MPC can close off
areas to new doctors, but cannot force them to locate in any other region,
or to insist that doctors within an under-doctored area encourage
colleagues to join them. In addition much of the negotiations with GPs
concerns pay disputes. This issue exemplifies the different objectives
between primary and secondary sectors. The GP contract determines a
practitioner’s income (an average). The negotiations are based on
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securing an average income for most GPs whereas the HCHS formula is
about distributing fair shares of the budget. The whole idea of the latter
is that you expect unequal shares based on equity. So both elements are
pulling in different ways.
By its own standards of crude list sizes the MPC has had a great
deal of success in equalising the distribution of GPs. However, the
MPC’s use raw and unweighted population data and average list sizes
to calculate an area’s need seems particularly crude and arcane in
comparison with other health measurements and formulae we shall
discuss. However, the fact remains that the core NHS service- the GP
primary practice- remains in the hands of private providers. The form of
funding reflects these origins.
…no preference of provider.
The Education Act of 1870 was more immediately significant in the
development of provision than in the funding of education, but its long-
term implications were profound. Financially it repealed Government
support for school building, and the exclusive support of private
education institutions. Instead, where the voluntary and private sector
had failed to provide enough places for elementary education ‘Board
schools’ were allowed to fill the gap. These were to be built out of the
local rate fund. Current costs of both Board and voluntary schools
would remain funded by the government, whose annual capitation
grant would now be supplemented in areas with large school
populations relative to their rateable value. This final provision showed
a clear understanding that there was some negative relationship in
deprived areas between need and the ability to pay for provision. Much
controversy surrounded the State’s move into the provision of schooling.
West (1975) has argued that central bureaucrats eager to extend their
role exaggerated the need for the state to step in. Sutherland (1971) has
shown that politicians were the prime movers in extending the role of
the Boards of Education areas with poor children and accepting the logic
that compulsory education entailed State funding. External pressure
from highly organised nonconformist groups within the Liberal Party
played a crucial part.
In 1895 the exam based funding formula for primary education
was abolished. Instead separate grants covering a percentage of
expenditure was seen as a more flexible means of funding, as it enabled
funding to be tailored to the unique ‘needs’ of each individual school.
Rather than create a system of homogenous schools producing uniform
young people, the myriad of specific percentage grants enabled a variety
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of specialisations. The 1902 Education Act attempted to unify many of
these grants but ultimately failed to do so, and by 1918 the funding
system had returned to an array of specific grants ‘which stimulated and
promoted expenditure in the particular ways thought desirable, rather
than in other ways’ (Webb 1920).
The Education Act of 1902 did establish Local Education
Authorities (LEAs), which were to run parallel to the new local
government authorities. The Act also placed an obligation on authorities
to supply, or aid the provision of education other than elementary.
There was no obligation to provide secondary education, simply to fund
a proportion of it, and those voluntary sector secondary schools that
could attract sufficient pupils from the elementary sector received a per
capita grant. These schools were to form the basis of the direct grant list,
which survived until 1976. A new ‘unified’ grant would now be paid to
the LEA who assumed responsibility for sub-regional distribution. This
grant was assessed according to an area’s poverty, using rateable values
as a proxy, its population, and school attendance.
Despite the early moves to amalgamate the various specific grants
awarded to the elementary sector, much of the secondary, further and
higher systems grew out of a variety of awards made by the Science and
Arts Department, which sponsored separate classes and institutions for
their areas of specialisation. Following the 1870 Act many Boards
established secondary level courses, which were funded partly through
the use of elementary grants, and partly by Science and Arts Department
awards. However this use of elementary education money was deemed
illegal by the high courts in 1899. Technical education, however, had
been funded differently for some years before this judgement. The
Technical Instruction Act of 1889 gave local authorities the power to
raise a 1d education tax, specifically designed to fund technical
education. The following year a system of assigned revenues was
established along the lines of the 1888 Local Government reforms, that
saw excise duties earmarked for education spending. Although the
contents of the 1889 Act were largely repealed by the 1902 Education Act
the assigned revenue from the ‘whisky money’ remained, and was
redistributed to areas according to their relative share in the collection
process.
…public sector providers.
The 1918 Education Act can be seen as a landmark piece of legislation
for two reasons. First, it signalled the end of a common Capitation Grant
for both private and public sectors. The bias in the 1902 Act towards
12
public provision was now firmly established. By 1926 voluntary schools
had to choose whether to receive funding from the LEA or directly from
central government. Once again there was another attempt to simplify
the structure of the grants, whose number and complexity had once
again multiplied. The new formula finally agreed upon was a fifty-
percent grant for secondary education, and a block grant for elementary
schooling based on a formula which took account of spending, pupil
numbers and the area’s rateable value. However, this formula
exemplified the problem of achieving equity by approximating
authorities’ different spending. A Capitation allowance was set, which
was the equivalent of 36s per pupil with average attendance levels,
together with additional allowances that would cover sixty percent of
teacher salaries, and twenty percent of all other costs. However, the
desire to achieve an equitable formula complicated matters. So as not to
over pay rich areas the grant was reduced by an equivalent of a 7d rate,
and expenditure criteria were built in that stated central government
spending on education could not amount to more than seventy-five
percent but no less than fifty percent of an LEA’s expenditure.
Increased provision and standards were the goal of the 1918 Act,
but Government policy in the face of worsening economic conditions
soon dampened the desire to increase public spending. In 1921 the
Committee on National Expenditure was appointed, and in the
subsequent report the percentage grant system was highly criticised for
encouraging spending at the expense of economy and efficiency. It also
criticised the open ended commitment central government had made to
spending, and highlighted how local authorities could dictate the Board
of Education’s budget. Following these attacks the Board of Education
issued a circular in 1925 proposing a switch from a percentage grant to a
block grant which would be fixed three years in advance. This faced
hostility from every sector of the education lobby, and was not, as
intended, incorporated into the new local government block grant
introduced in 1929. Once again, in 1931, education spending faced cuts,
yet the percentage system remained intact, and proved remarkably
resistant to periods of economic downturn (Vaizey and Sheehan 1968).
Although the Education Act of 1944 and the Local Government
finance reforms of 1948 were extremely important pieces of legislation,
they did very little to alter the way in which education was funded. The
former piece of legislation was concerned primarily with provision, and
the debate over religious instruction excluded practically all other issues.
What little changes did occur simply reinforced the existing structure, so
that education funding between 1946 and 1958 was calculated according
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to a basic sum per child, plus sixty percent net expenditure, minus the
income from a specified local rate. Special provisions were added to
cover teacher training, school meals and free milk. The latter legislation
simply brought local government finance into line with the
predominantly percentage system already being used for education.
The structure of secondary health care before the creation of the
NHS has been described above, and consisted of both voluntary
hospitals run independently of the public sector and municipal
institutions administered by local authorities. With most active
authorities this role steadily expanded throughout the inter-war period.
These authorities had inherited the old Poor Law infirmaries, and after
legislation passed in 1890 were able to build new general purpose
institutions. Although the voluntary hospitals were the more prestigious
they were also more likely to be expensive, more selective regarding
whom they treated, and concentrated in the more affluent locations. By
the turn of the century voluntary hospitals also found themselves
awkwardly placed to deal with the rapidly rising demand for and
expense of medical care, whilst, at the same time, local authorities began
building more general hospitals, and their stigma of treating paupers
began to diminish.
By 1938 this had led to the paradoxical situation whereby the most
prestigious institutions – the voluntary hospitals – supplied the least
amount of beds and faced the greatest financial difficulties seen in the
medical sector. Their dependence upon public resources intensified
under Emergency Medical Service, created to cope with a war time
situation. Between 1938 and 1947 donations fell from 33 per cent of
hospitals’ revenue to 16 per cent, while fees paid by public authorities
rose from 8 per cent to 45 per cent. Yet even the best endowed group of
voluntary hospitals at the top of the pyramid – London teaching
hospitals – had a revenue deficit of £2 millions by the time they were
nationalised (Forsyth 1966). Municipal hospitals on the other hand were
mainly financed through local rates supplemented by the Exchequer
block grants to local government. Within this framework responsible
authorities were assumed to charge patients according to their means.
This was assumed to be the method adopted by voluntary hospitals,
though two exceptions are worth noting. The first concerns refusal to
treat patients. Often an inability to pay coupled with long-term or
particularly costly illnesses meant patients were turned away under the
assumption that they could then turn to municipal provision. Second,
treatment was often permitted under membership of ad hoc hospital
contribution schemes. These payments were not in any sense proper
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prepayment insurance plans, yet membership had still, by the outbreak
of war, reached 7 million people, and accounted for around half the
revenue of the voluntary sector.
Stage 1 so far
Education most closely fits the first stage of the theory outlined at the
beginning of the paper. Private provision is subsidised to a growing
degree, public provision is introduced first in cases where the voluntary
sectors fail to provide (and where local nonconformists press hard to
avoid a monopoly in Church of England provision). Once established
the public sector with its great taxing powers gradually expands at the
expense of the private and not-for-profit sectors, notably after free
provision was introduced. Payments to private secondary schools for
pupils transferring from the State sector remains a major and important
avenue of provision up to and after the 1944 Education Act. Yet public
provision has steadily extended its scope responding to funding
mechanisms devised by central politicians and civil servants.
Health care followed a rather less steady incremental progress
through each of the postulated stages, but the end result was similar.
GPs remained private agents but were to be largely public funded as the
scope of National Insurance brought in successive extensions of covered
groups during the 1920s and 1930s. Voluntary hospitals’ private funding
had declined steadily over the same period, but the War brought a
sudden infusion of public money. Local Medical officers working in
combination with active politicians in authorities like the LCC,
Middlesex County Council and Labour authorities in the north of
England and Wales extended the scope of public hospitals
The cyclical nature of resource allocation in social housing
Social housing can be placed within the model outlined above, but the
story is a little different. Firstly, the chronological development of social
housing formulae is less linear than that followed by education and
health. For example, central government did attempt to encourage
provision through subsidies to the private sector, but only after a similar
offer to local authorities. Similarly, there is a recurrent cycle in policy up
until 1972, where redundant subsidies are revisited after being
abandoned years before. Holding the model constant for housing,
therefore, would only lead to a muddled chronology. Secondly, given
that social housing never became a universal service in a similar way to
education and health, there is no period that adequately corresponds to
stage 2. Yet even if the sequence of policy implementation is different
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there is a shared objective of using public subsidies as incentives to
expand provision. Nevertheless, discussion of the social housing is best
separated from that of education and health.
Up to 1921
Nineteenth century state intervention in, and provision of, housing was
at the same time similar and different to that taking place in the
education and health sectors. The similarities concern the level and
direction of public resources. Shelter was only funded for the destitute
pauper within workhouses under the provisions of the 1834 Poor Law.
Legislation was enabling, and committed no resources from central
government for the construction of houses, which would then be let at
lower rents. For most this was morally wrong, and opposed for all the
reasons the old Poor Law system had been reformed.
However, there were suggestions before the First World War that
financial assistance should be given to local authorities in order to build
working class homes. The first such Bill was introduced to Parliament in
1912, but together with similar proposals in 1913 and 1914 failed to gain
any significant section of support. During the same period the Royal
Commission on Housing in Scotland (est. 1912, reported in 1917) was
investigating the pre-war accommodation shortages. The Royal
Commission’s Minority Report advocated a subsidy,
payable to men with three children or more, equal to the
difference between the average rent of a two-roomed-
dwelling and “the higher rent of which would be requisite
for the proper housing of the family on the higher standard
to be enforced in the near future” (Holmans 1987).
Rather than allocate resources to local authorities to build homes this
proposal suggested paying a specific cash benefit to the family whom
could choose their preferred tenure and landlord. In principle such a
system would work in a similar way to Housing Benefit (HB), although
it took another fifty-five years before the rent rebate, precursor of the
HB, was implemented. It has been suggested that this proposal was
unacceptable to the political classes of Edwardian England because
Labouring men were not trusted to maximise their
satisfaction in a sober and sanitary manner acceptable to the
middle classes. Tory paternalism and nonconformist
compassion could be alike the enemies of choice (McKie
1971; quoted in Holmans 1987).
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Therefore, government intervention before 1919 was limited to
granting local authorities the power to build new homes and to control
rents. The first government housing subsidy introduced in 1919 was
therefore significant for its positive nature of encouraging building
through financial incentives. Subsidies were deemed necessary to build
the 500,000 new homes needed by the returning troops. The
Government believed this number could be built within three years
given the generous nature of the subsidy system offered to local
authorities under the terms of the 1919 Housing Act. But in order to get
local public bodies to even consider undertaking the scale of
construction needed the Government had to guarantee that local
authority liability would be limited to a penny rate. The Exchequer
would then fund the difference between the income from a rent level set
by a government officer and the cost of the project. There were two
unforeseen consequences of this legislation. The first was short term,
and concerned the rising costs of construction. The construction cost of
the average working class house in 1914 was £250. However, the
combination of inflation, scarce resources and higher standards meant
that tender prices for subsidised housing in 1920 had risen to £930 per
unit, whilst the cost of completion in 1921 was £1200 (Malpass and
Murie 1987). It was left to the government to meet this increase, given
that there was no incentive for local authorities to economise.
In the longer term the subsidy set an important precedent for
future housing policy. Once bitten, the Exchequer would, forever more
be shy of any system with an open ended liability. Nevertheless,
although the estimated construction numbers and their cost were
inaccurate, the Addison Act proved that government subsidies
encouraged the construction of social housing. Thirdly the Act allowed
authority discretion in determining housing needs. The assumption was
that, if an area had need of additional housing and the subsidy was set
at a fair amount, then a responsible authority would build the necessary
amount. In practice some authorities were far more willing to build than
others were.
1923–1972
There have been three identifiable periods of local authority construction
for general housing needs, all of which begin with a generous central
government subsidy. These periods were 1919 to 1930, 1946 to 1956, and
1961 until 1972. The beginning of each period was marked by a desire to
build high quality homes exemplified through the publication of reports
by the Tudor Walters Committee (LGB 1918, Cmnd 9191), the Dudley
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Committee (CHAC 1944), and Parker Morris (CHAC 1961). But high
standards meant slower more costly construction, and within several
years of their publication the standards initially advocated were diluted
under the pressure to build more units quicker and cheaper (Merret
1979; Malpass and Murie 1987). These periods concluded with subsidies
for general need housing being discontinued. Instead resources were
targeted very narrowly into slum clearances and renovations. Generally
this pattern was repeated three times up to 1972 and forms the social
housing resource allocation cycle outlined below (figure 2).
1923 saw the return of recurrent subsidies. The difference between
the Chamberlain subsidy and its 1919 predecessor concerned the main
recipients of resources. Addison’s Act had seen local government as the
only viable sector able to build the amount of homes needed in the
timescale set down. ‘Normal conditions would return by 1927’ following
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Figure 2: The local authority housing subsidy cycle, 1919-1972
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the construction of 500,000 subsidised homes. The subsidy could then be
phased out and rents de-controlled; but with a strain on resources local
authorities proved unable to meet these ambitious targets.
Chamberlain’s subsidy was different because it broadened the access to
Government subsidies to include public and private builders alike.
There was no mandatory rate fund contribution, and the Treasury
commitment was set at £6 a year for twenty years. The system was
simple to understand and, and became the blueprint for the classic
British housing formula of £x for y years (Holmans 1987). The Act was
specifically designed to stimulate the private sector, with no control on
the rent of the new houses. Local authorities could only apply for the
subsidy having proved local need. Although this was not difficult given
the chronic housing shortages it did have the effect of weeding out all
but the most enthusiastic local authority construction. During the six
years in which the subsidy operated 75,900 homes were built by local
authorities, whilst 362,000 were built by private landlords.
However, this was not to suggest a marginal role for local
authorities in the long term. In 1924 an additional subsidy system was
introduced by the minority Labour Government. The new subsidy was
only available to local authorities and other ‘public utility societies’. It
held the structure of the classic formula constant but increased the
annual award by fifty per cent, and doubled the duration of payment.
‘Appropriate normal rents’ were set at average working class levels in
1914, and mandatory rate fund contributions, up to 4s 10d, were to
ensure this. If costs were to make this rent/income equation unworkable
rents could be increased to offset the loss. Therefore, in practice, rents
did rise significantly above the Governments desired level. Over half a
million local authority homes were built with the assistance of the
Wheatley Act before 1933 and together with the Chamberlain Act
established the pattern for subsidies up until 1967. Post war general
need subsidies took much the same structure, simply altering the values
of x and y to keep pace with construction costs.
Towards the end of the 1920s there was a growing concern that
general need housing only benefited the more affluent working class.
New houses were doing little to displace the worst homes, whose rents
remained the cheapest alternative for the very poor. The economic crash
of 1929 heightened this concern for wasted resources. Therefore, as the
perceived demand for general need housing lessened resources began to
be redirected into slum clearance policies. The period between 1930 and
1933 saw two Acts which targeted resources on the worst areas, the
repeal of the one remaining general need subsidy, and the publication of
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a report on Public Expenditure. The latter again criticised the waste of
general need subsidies in building homes that the most needy still could
not afford. It also noted the reluctance of authorities to operate rebates
and house the poorest people in their districts.
Following the War, during which domestic construction had been
sacrificed for the war effort, the desire to build high quality general
needs housing returned. This brought policy full circle. Once again
quality, standards and unit cost were substituted for an increase in
absolute numbers, but after annual construction targets were met the
numbers game began to lose its appeal. The benefit no longer justified
the cost, and the Government announced its intention to terminate
general need subsidies in 1955. In its place rose subsidies designed to
stimulate local authorities slum clearances, and for the private sector to
undertake renovations and new general need construction. However, by
1961 general need subsidies had returned, and the third policy cycle
began. The remarkable feature of each period is how similar each was to
its predecessor (see figure 3).
Despite these similarities the third cycle did show signs that the
recurrent cycle which had been set in motion after the First World War.
In 1964 the Housing Corporation was formed, with the clear intention of
providing an alternative means of construction and tenure within the
public sector. Up until the 1960s local authority building had been
encouraged through the ‘classic British housing subsidy, but high
inflation and interest rates quickly undermined the value of these
awards. The 1967 Housing Subsidies Act was the first attempt to
overcome this problem. New subsidies would be calculated on the
difference between loan charges at 4 per cent interest and the real
market rate. However, although the system offset variations in interest
rates local authority construction continued to decline up until 1973, and
by 1969 the government had returned to a modernised form of slum
clearance policy, introducing special subsidies for new ‘general
improvement areas’.
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By the 1970s several forces were at work undermining the cycle of
housing subsidies. One was the decline in crude housing shortages. The
large-scale construction of the previous three decades had, by the mid-
1970s led to a glut in the supply homes, and many council properties
remained empty. Another reason for this was that as the quality of local
authority housing declined it became less desirable (Power 1987). There
was also a growing concern that the subsidy system failed to reflect the
different needs and financial burden of various authorities. The new
subsidy system in 1967 was the first break with all that had gone before,
and foresaw the more radical changes that were to take place over the
next two decades.
Yet the cyclical nature of housing subsidies does not end with the
decline of new council housing during the 1970s. A current
manifestation can be identified with reform of the Housing Association
sector over the last decade. As described below, the Housing Association
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Grant that matured after the 1974 Housing Act was designed to
encourage the growth of alternative providers of social housing than
existing local authorities. Perhaps because of this overtly political goal of
extending the diversity of landlord capital grants were generous. By the
late eighties, there were occasions when these grants could be worth
more than the total development costs of a project. Essential in the
calculation of subsidy were the desired rent levels and design and
construction standards. The purpose of these grants was to ensure these
requirements, in much the same way as stage one in the housing cycles
outlined above.
This system of capital grants was reformed in 1989 and replaced
with a system that placed far greater emphasis on value for money and
increasing the scale of new housing association development (DoE,
1987). Again there is a close resemblance between the objectives that the
Conservative government transposed onto the Housing Association
grant system between 1990 and 1997, and administrations that used
housing subsidies to play the ‘numbers game’ during the 1950s and
1960s. This system lasted until 1996/7 when the effect on rents of open
competition for grants was deemed not to be a price worth paying.
Results from the recent Comprehensive Spending Review have
suggested that the relative importance of renovation should be
increased. This is a clear echo of the final stage in the housing cycle
outlined above- when general need subsidies are substituted with
improvement grants. Although the current policy is to maintain the
general level of new development funded through the Housing
Corporation’s Approved Development Programme there is no doubt
that a desire to alter the emphasis of policy towards using existing stock
in a more effective manner.
There are notable differences in the nature and detail between this
latter cycle and previous subsidies. Yet the similarities are also striking.
Conservative Party solutions to social housing questions may have
presented radical alternatives for provision, and the promotion of
Housing Associations at the expense of local authorities was a break
with earlier policy tenets. However, the objective of government grants
has been less radical, and continuity with previous cycles is clear.
Stage 1 and housing
We have seen that housing finance does not fit the developmental
pattern we outlined at the beginning. Housing never moves from stage 1
to stage 2 – mass universal provision. Indeed it is characterised by a
cyclical pattern that depends on the overall pattern of demand and
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supply of housing, taking a residual role throughout. While housing
skips stage 2 it does, as we shall see, converge with other services on
stage 3.
Local authority grants before 1948
Whilst education, health and housing were developing their own
funding formulae a significant part of the debate surrounding resource
allocation concerned local government finance. Any history of funding
formulae must, therefore also take account of developments in local
government finance as a whole.
Between 1835 and 1888 a number of specific percentage grants
were established to cover local authority spending on the Poor Law,
policing, and other law and order costs (Drummond 1962). However, as
noted earlier, there were two main problems with percentage grants.
First, ‘percentage grants probably worked against the interest of high
need authorities, because authorities with bigger expenditure needs
often found it difficult to maintain high levels of spending because of the
poverty of their local tax base’ (Hale and Travers 1993). Second, these
grants often created an overall picture, which grew increasingly complex
as more services were financed, transferring power to central
government (Metson 1933; Clarke 1939).
So discussion begun in 1887 on replacing the percentage system
with assigned revenues from new customs and excise duties. The
controversy surrounding the Bill centred on the three different methods
that were proposed for determining allocation. The first two were
allocation according to rateable values and total population. Both were
dismissed as inaccurate measurements of need. The third- the number of
paupers in workhouses- was believed to be a far better indicator of need.
Yet even this drew criticism for overlooking the outdoor relief provided
by some authorities. In the end the Goschen-sponsored Local
Government Act of 1888 distributed resources partly on the basis of an
authorities spending during the preceding year, and partly on the basis
of the relative yields of the earmarked taxes (Foster, Jackman and
Perlman 1980; Hale and Travers 1993). The compromise simply
prolonged the inequitable distribution that existed before 1888, with the
addition of the inadequacy allocation according to historic spending
patterns.
By 1929 this system had been eroded by a number of percentage
grants that had sprung up to finance new local government services.
Both the 1888 system and more especially percentage grants were
widely condemned by the number of Government Committees and
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Commissions set up to investigate local government finance, as having
no relation to need, committing central authorities to open ended
spending commitments. The alternative that was finally introduced to
Parliament was Chamberlain’s block grant. Although this block grant
covered less than a fifth of the total amount paid to local government it
was the first time a formula incorporating some measurement or proxy
of expenditure needs and the local ability to pay had been used to
distribute a government grant. In trying to calculate need from the
centre it was a radical departure from its predecessors. As this system
was refined over the remainder of the century it was to become
increasingly complicated. Nevertheless it still managed to confuse many
politicians, amongst whom Lady Astor probably showed the most
candour when she stated that ‘I do not understand one quarter of it, but
neither does anyone else. I do not understand electricity, but derive
benefit from it’. Her lack of understanding and trust in the bureaucracy
that administer such formulae were not unique in the history of funding
formulae.
Stage 2: Extensive Provision Established through the Public
Sector
In education and health the beginning of stage two is clearly marked by
two pieces of legislation- the 1944 Education Act, and the 1946 National
Health Act. Both services were nationalised, with access becoming
universal. Although pre-war public provision in education and health
may have been extensive, and in many ways larger than its private
counterpart, these Acts greatly extended the scope of the services at the
expense of private provision. Private institutions were marginalised,
with public institutions remaining the dominant means provision for the
remainder of the century (Burchardt 1997). Public and social housing has
never gained such a status, and therefore remains outside the focus of
this section. Stage two is a summary of how funding formulae reacted to
this ‘New Jerusalem’.
Following the 1944 Education and 1946 National Health Service
Acts grants slowly developed to incorporate the very different nature of
universal provision. Both education and health formulae showed similar
post-war patterns of development. Initially funding was allocated
according to historic spending patterns with annual incremental
increases. Gradually these systems evolved into block grants, which then
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became more specific in their targeting and objectives and refined in
defining, need.
The entitlement to education was radically altered by the 1944
education Act. Provision, access and quality were nevertheless
restrained by the locational infrastructure of school buildings. Almost
the entire debate surrounding the Act centred on the issue of religious
instruction and Church schools. Getting the churches on board was
central to the success of any such Bill. Nevertheless the dark cloud did
have a silver lining. To ensure the support of churches Butler conceded a
generous percentage grant for new building schemes. A similar
agreement was made with local authorities. Comparable percentage
grants were used to finance revenue expenditure, which remained
independent of the local government block grant up until 1958. Thus
from 1944 to 1958 the grant expectation of primary and secondary
education was to meet the child population growth and to establish a
full pattern of secondary education in England and Wales driven by
generous allocation of funds provided out of general taxation.
When, in 1958, education funding was finally incorporated into the
grant to local government the fear was that spending on schools would
be squeezed by the demands of other services. The anxiety proved ill-
founded for three reasons. Firstly, the Department of Education and
Science ‘had evolved a system of administrative control which enabled it
to influence local authority programmes quite apart from any incentives
which might be derived from the specific form of education grant’
(Rhodes 1976). Secondly, a large amount of current expenditure in
education was and is fixed into teachers salaries, whose salary and
location was unaffected by the behaviour of individual authorities
(Byrne 1974; Lawrence 1972). Between 1956 and 1972 a teacher’s quota
system was enforced. It sought to limit recruitment in popular areas, and
encourage teachers to seek jobs elsewhere in much the same way as the
practice administered on behalf of GPs by the MPC. Finally, it has been
argued that during periods when the child population is increasing the
system of allocating revenue resources is of secondary importance
compared to capital allocations (Griffiths 1966). The control exerted by
the Ministry over the form and location of capital spending has
remained tight throughout the post-war period.
The sum of these processes was that education funding increased
rapidly even after its incorporation into the local government grant. The
‘general’ grant introduced in 1958 was in itself a major step forward in
needs equalisation compared to its predecessor. Since 1948 government
support for local services had been through a series of specific
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percentage grants, supplemented in poor areas with an ‘Exchequer
equalisation grant’, whose aim was to raise the local rate base up to the
average level (Hale and Travers 1993). Its 1958 replacement incorporated
most of the individual specific grants into one block grant whose
formula was broken down into the three components, which were the
‘basic share’, the ‘supplementary share’, and a ‘rate product deduction’.
The basic share was a set amount per person, with a small addition for
under-15s. Additional payments were made under the second heading
for schoolchildren, under 5s, old people, areas of high density or
sparsity, declining population and areas within London. This was an
acknowledgement of the greater need that was associated with these
groups, though the discussion preceding the Act only went as far as
mentioning fairness. In addition the weightings given to each
component were the subjective outcome of these talks (Travers 1986;
Hale and Travers 1993). The final element of the 1958 grant was a
resource equalisation payment called the rate deficiency grant. This was
simply a reformed version of Exchequer equalisation grant described
above.
In 1967-8 the grant was updated again. The general grant became
the Needs Element, and the rate deficiency grant the Resources Element
of the new Rate Support Grant, which also included an additional
component designed to ensure domestic rates were kept below those of
businesses. The Needs Element contained almost the same list of
characteristics as the old general grant, with the addition of ‘education
units’. This was the heading for a sub-formula based on education-
related factors that were designed to be more sensitive to needs.
Although this added complexity to its calculation, and was the
forerunner of the modern grant formulae which amalgamate many
service sub-formulae, the RSG was the ‘last in the age of (relative)
innocence for needs grants, needs equalisation and needs assessment’
(Hale and Travers 1993).
Funding for the health service between 1948 and 1962 was based
on incremental increases set by the Hospital Management Committees.
If a formula did exist it was based on ‘what you got last year, plus an
allowance for growth, plus an allowance for scandals’ (Maynard and
Ludbrook 1988). Negligible amounts were spent on capital projects, and
allocation was allocated to the noisiest rather than the neediest (Mays
and Bevan 1987). By the late 1950s the system was accentuating regional
inequalities, and was further criticised for not sustaining adequate levels
of funding (Guillebeud 1956).
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In response the Government committed themselves to major
capital investments as a partial solution to regional inequalities. The
investment was to be guided by the 1962 Hospital Plan for England and
Wales, which envisaged equalisation through capital planning. In time
the more equitable distribution of hospitals would work itself through to
current spending through the Revenue Consequence of Capital Schemes
(RCCS). Areas with new hospitals would therefore gain more revenue to
staff and run them. Following the publication of the Plan capital
spending did rise, though from a very low base. Yet the result was not
an equitable distribution of resources, due to capital expenditure being
used to renovate exiting buildings (Klein 1995). A reform to the plan in
1966 did little to alter this situation, and regional inequalities remained
the prevalent feature of hospital resources before the 1970s.
Stage 2 reviewed
Stage two is marked can be defined by attitudes towards legislation.
During the early post war years it was believed that abolishing fee
payments and creating universal institutions was sufficient to meet the
needs of the population. But as the welfare state matured the realisation
grew that geographical differences created different levels of need or
potential demand for services. Differential availability of service itself
posed a second kind of problem – enough doctors, beds, teachers or
desks. Once universal primary and secondary education had been
achieved, and once access to free universal health care had been
(virtually) achieved in the 1950s and 1960s, so political pressure and
academic critical interest began to turn to the question of distribution –
income distribution in cash benefits and area distribution in services in-
kind (Townsend and Bosanquet 1972; Cooper and Culyer 1970; Davies
1968).
These issues began to emerge for debate before the era of austerity
began in the mid-1970s but serious attention devoted to geographical
allocations rises sharply after the economic crises of that time. Stage 3
begins.
Stage 3: Universal Coverage brings a Strain on Resources –
funding formulae used to make the hard choices.
Up to the 1970s the primarily concern of the education sector was the
acquisition of enough resources to meet the needs of a rising school
population. The comparison with health shows how more resources
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made this task far easier than it could have been. When the demographic
pressure began to ease during the late 1960s central Government became
increasingly preoccupied with standards and restraining spending
increases. In order to achieve the latter the government promoted
efficiency and encouraged local authorities to make the best use of their
stock (school buildings and teachers). Safeguarding standards during a
period of resource standstill required the Government to develop an
interest in how it could control how money was spent. This objective
had distinct results.
Firstly, capital spending was cut. Loan sanctions for building
schemes had become one of the main ways in which the Government
could control local authority resource allocation after 1957(Griffith 1966).
Local authority bids for capital expenditure had, not only to conform to
Government building standards and cost limits, but also to be submitted
under one of the Ministry’s specific headings of major (school building)
work, minor works, special education, teacher training and further
education. LEAs had to submit annual proposals, ranking each project
according to priority, and establish their need according to pupil
numbers and projected figures. In 1974 the DES produced modifications
to this system which gave a lump sum allocation under one of three
headings (primary and secondary; nursery; special and further
education), with the minor works programme abolished. There were
three stages before the final loan sanction was made. Once the final
sanction had been made the LEA was free to choose which projects it
wished to go ahead with. This system gave less freedom than local
authorities initially thought, with restricted budgets effectively
restraining freedom of choice (Morris 1983; Regan 1977). In 1980 the
Local Government Planning and Land Act changed the system once
again and replaced loan sanctions with overall expenditure controls.
This gave local authorities greater discretion over which areas received
resources within their budgets, but placed tight restrictions on how and
when LEAs could spend their allocation.
Secondly, the amount of specific grants increased dramatically
during the 1970s. This form of resource allocation had declined
throughout the 1960s, with such awards as the Schools and Meals Grant
being incorporated into the main Rate Support Grant in 1967/8.
Although they remained a small proportion of overall spending it did
show an intention to direct spending very precisely. Another interesting
point about such grants is that they were often allocated by Departments
other than the DES, and were used to promote policy objectives with a
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broad cross over into other Ministerial areas such as employment or
industry (Morris 1983).
Despite the rise of specific grants the majority of education
funding remained an integral feature of the local government block
grant throughout this period, and allowed a great deal of local authority
autonomy over sub-regional allocation. Between 1970 and the mid-1980s
the distribution formula for local government changed three times, often
resulting in greater central control over how and where resources were
used. Annual budget allocations during the 1970s were a process of
negotiation between the Local Authority Association and central
government. The negotiations were one of the ways in which central
authorities could express how much and where they wished resources to
be spent. To this end an Education Steering group was formed in 1970 to
provide the basis for negotiations by assessing future expenditure. The
second way in which central government affected allocation was with
the use of the distribution formulae. Under the RSG system more
children meant greater education need and consequently more resources.
Funding according to this need element continued until the introduction
of GREs in 1981, which was based on the provision of a common
standard of service. This system calculated the national average cost of
educating a child, and multiplied this figure with the number of ‘clients’
within the LEA boundary.
Throughout the 1960s it was becoming increasingly obvious that
the distribution of resources within the National Health Service bore
little resemblance to the principles which Bevan had proclaimed three
decades earlier. Equity of access was not consistent on a nationwide
basis, and the allocation of resources was still dependent upon the
historic distribution of hospitals. The inverse care law that the NHS was
meant to dispel still existed. The limited amounts of capital investment
associated with the two Hospital Plans during the 1960s meant little was
done to solve these problems. A growing number of academics studied
the related issues and a new subject area called health economics became
an effective lobby for reform. Recent studies highlight their influence in
the development of the formulae during the 1970s (Hurst 1997). Work
done by economists at Exeter and later York University was to direct
attention to the continuing if not growing inequalities in resource
allocation between different regions (Cooper and Culyer 1970). Civil
Servants began to take note of these criticisms. Interviews with civil
servants who remember this period were clearly strongly influenced by
these findings and convinced by the logic. They had internalised the
idea that the NHS was about equal access and the facts suggested this
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goal was not being achieved. Work began within the Department of
Health and Social Security to consider what to do about it. When the
Labour party was returned to government in 1974 this problem was
readdressed. Brian Abel-Smith, Crossman’s influential political advisor
became Barbara Castle’s adviser. He urged the issue to be taken up
again by the new Secretary of State, David Owen, himself a doctor who
was deeply committed to doing something about the allocation problem.
There was also growing political concern amidst some government
officials and politicians regarding the inequitable distribution of
resources. It was believed regions in which Labour had a strong
representation were losing out to more affluent areas. Before Labour’s
election defeat in 1970 Richard Crossman had introduced a formula
(used for the first time in 1971) that attempted to redirect resources to
those who needed it most. In many respects this formula was a
compromise between the Hospital Plans of the 1960s and the allocation
formulas of the future. There were stark drawbacks to the Crossman
formula. 50% of revenue expenditure was based on population, and 50%
on the number beds and cases treated within a Regional Health Board.
This meant that although half the formula included some crude but
objective measure of need, the other half remained wedded to historic
spending.
Finding an appropriate solution to the inverse care problem was
finally given to a new Resource Allocation Working Party, whose initial
report was published and adopted in 1975. Its conclusion was to create a
new formula that assessed health needs according to measurements of
population and mortality ratios. Before the details of this formula could
be worked out an interim system was implemented based simply on
population and caseload calculated at a ratio of 3:1. The full report,
published in 1976 based funding on weighted populations that
envisaged an equitable allocation of revenue and capital resources
between and within regions. Resources were to be based primarily on
the calculation of a Standard Mortality Ratio (SMR) which was used a
measurement of morbidity, and a proxy for need. A region's need, and
therefore allocation, would be calculated on the difference between
national and regional SMRs for various areas of healthcare. The system
was not without its critics (for summary see Maynard and Ludbrook
1980; Mays and Bevan 1987; Carr-Hill et al. 1994), but RAWP was the
most significant step undertaken by the health sector towards an
equitable distribution of resources based on some measure of need. Over
the following decade RAWP did lessen regional differences, and
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achieved remarkable regional equality in the distribution of resources in
comparison with many other nations.
RAWP has remained central to health allocation formulae with its
plain objective that equity should be at the heart of the process setting
the standard by which future formulae were to be judged. Equity was
interpreted as ‘equal opportunity of access to healthcare for people at
equal risk’ (DoH 1976). It allocated funds on the basis of population,
adjusted for variations in the age structure weighted for health needs
and costs (Peacock and Smith 1995). Although the content and
calculation of these factors has changed over time with the introduction
of new formulae, this fundamental method has remained at the core of
all subsequent systems. The objective of the formula was to ensure that
sufficient sums of money were made available to purchase equal access
given the assumption that all RHAs and districts spent their money with
equal efficiency. Obviously there were managerial and administrative
efficiency issues that affected the effectiveness of this objective, but these
are separate problems which the formula dealt with only indirectly.
RAWP was the first time that geographical equity had been firmly
implanted as a core objective of the NHS, although it was viewed as
being totally consistent with the statements made in 1946 that stressed
the removal of barriers to access. Nevertheless, the new formula was a
major departure from all the funding systems that had gone before, and
was an acknowledgement of the failure of previous systems to achieve
similar objectives. The formula proposed by RAWP made no allowance
for historic spending patterns and potentially meant significant shifts
away from over-resourced areas like London and the southeast. Given
this it is surprising how little opposition the report and the Government
faced from regional offices. There may be several reasons for this.
Equity, and the notion of a national service consists of deeply held
public values when it comes to the NHS, moreover officials
administering the bureaucracy do what they are told. Unlike local
authorities, local health authorities are not political bodies regional
offices may be sufficiently removed from those that the formula
adversely affected. In addition, for central bureaucrats this was a new
and interesting technical job to do. This implies that trouble would come
from the districts or even individual hospitals, a theory partly borne out
in the example of London. The capital could see the potential drain of
resources away from the city in favour of other regions and lobbied
heavily for some compensating allowance. In response the Labour
government commissioned the Advisory Group on Resource Allocation
(AGRA) to investigate the issue during 1979, and the main
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recommendations of the report, published the following year, were
adopted by the new Conservatives administration (DHSS 1980). Its main
recommendation was to introduce a Market Forces Factor (MFF)
element into the formula in acknowledgement of the higher costs faced
by authorities in London and the southeast. Despite justified arguments
and reliable reasoning both beneficiaries and others complained. To the
London-lobby it was not enough, whilst for others it was too much.
Another reason for the lack of fundamental opposition is that the
formula has always been applied with due regard to the ability of the
NHS to deal with change. In other words it has been applied very
gradually. Reading the RAWP report the impression was that the move
towards an equitable distribution of resources would be achieved very
quickly as targets for change were set. In practice the formula was
implemented gradually and movement towards a target allocation was
achieved through differing ‘growth rates’. Those ‘below target’ gained
resources, whilst those above target stood still. Health service budgets
have always been seen as a very political issue, and cutting regional
budgets would not be desirable. The extent to which the formula has
been applied has been judged very carefully with due regard to its
effects on individual RHA or HA budgets. The pace of change, therefore,
has enabled successive Ministers to take political decisions whose
results, in hindsight, may seem very strange. Unlike the position faced
by colleagues in other departments the discussion regarding the HCHS
formula is not about next year’s allocation, but rather a target that is
desirable for some time in the future.
Although the share of local authority housing as a proportion of
the entire housing stock did not reach its peak until 1978 (Hills 1991), the
sea change in attitudes and policy had occurred some years before. By
the mid-1980s the proportion of homes owned by local authorities had
declined sharply, and their role as the primary developers of social
housing was being eroded by housing associations. Both the cause and
effect of this shift were changes to the way in which social housing was
financed.
In terms of capital expenditure a number of ad hoc controls were
introduced between 1974 and 1976 governing local authority
improvement work, mortgage lending, local authority house building,
and private sector improvement. The Housing Act 1974 replaced the
individual scrutiny of each local authority improvement scheme with an
overall capital allocation (DOE 160/74). These ‘section 105’ allocations
were determined in a two stage process. First, a study group on
programmes of social ownership and renovation of council dwellings
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was set up to determine the criteria of distribution to the regions, then,
secondly the DoE’s regional offices made the final allocations to
individual authorities. Within this process priority was to be given to
areas of housing stress (DOE 33/76). Mortgage lending became subject
to similar controls midway through 1975/6, and the following year
authorities were given a quota of 85% of their 1974/5 spending (DOE
80/76). Another major step was taken in July 1976 when it was decided
to put a limit on the number of tenders that could be accepted by local
authorities after the 23rd of the same month (Harrison and Webber 1977).
Areas of housing stress would have first priority in determining the
levels of house building, and in 1976/7 these areas managed to maintain
their levels of activity, whilst the activity of non- stress areas was cut by
a third (DOE 80/76; Harrison and Webber 1977).
These changes had been largely inspired by a desire to exercise a
closer control over capital expenditure for macro-economic purposes.
They did not aid local authority planning and priority setting in housing
and the authorities pressed for a more comprehensive approach to
housing problems. The Labour Government’s review of housing policy
recognised the need to develop this aspect, and in 1976 introduced the
Housing Investment Programme (HIP). Within this scheme local
authorities were to develop housing strategies taking into account both
the public and the private sectors. The basis of the strategy would be a
four-year capital expenditure plan approved by the DOE. The HIP
procedure would thus give
greater co-ordination and sensitivity in the assessment and
allocation of capital funds to be used for housing purposes
so that both central and local government can respond more
effectively in the determination of priorities and in directing
resources where need is greatest (DOE 63/77).
Again, although the stated aims were needs related and equity driven,
the implementation of the system gave the impression that HIPs was
more a means of controlling and cutting expenditure than of sensitivity
to needs. There is some truth and some falsehood in such a claim.
The HIP submission is a bid for a fixed pot of resources
determined in the PESC process, which is then distributed to the regions
following a consultation process with local authorities in which they are
required to present their strategy statement, a numerical housing
appraisal and a formal request for capital. Resources are then allocated
to DOE regional offices and then from these bodies down to the local
authorities according to three sets of criteria. The first was the
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‘Concentration of Needs’ element. This was a portion of resources
earmarked for use in the inner city partnership and programme
authorities. Secondly, resources were distributed according to a ‘General
Needs Index’. This is by far the most important element of the three, and
is based on a weighted index of nine measures of housing need. Thirdly,
some resources were distributed on a discretionary basis. However,
relatively few resources within the pot are left for officials to make such
allocations, although there are examples of Regional Offices gaining
resources by withholding sums that a pure GNI allocation would
assume (Houlihan 1984).
One objective of the HIP was to encourage greater flexibility in
planning housing expenditures between the many areas of local
authority activity. In making their original bids for expenditure
authorities were required to outline their proposals in each of seven
categories. Over the course of the following four years after its
implementation these seven categories were merged together into one
block allocation. However, before this was achieved, the Government
could exercise some influence over what form of capital expenditure it
wanted local authorities to undertake. Another of the possible intentions
behind HIPs that was never realised is forward planning. The desire to
create a rolling four-year capital programme has never been achieved
due to Treasury opposition. Allocations have been kept to an annual
process, in which authorities have seen the overall amount of resources
made available drop significantly. The Local Government Planning and
Land Act 1980 extended capital expenditure controls in place of
borrowing limits on all capital projects. HIPs had been the forerunner of
this reform, but now allocations made to one service could be used for
another, whilst capital allocation in general could be supplemented by
the receipts from the sale of local authority capital stock. Finally, in
setting capital allocations for each financial year, restrictions were placed
in HIPs on the expenditure that could be carried over from one year to
the next. Local authorities were placed under greater pressure to
consider the timing of their projects.
Over the same period the housing subsidy system also underwent
major reforms. Central to this was the Housing Finance Act 1972, whose
central policy was establishing the ‘fair rents’ in the public sector (DOE
1971). Inequity was perceived within the housing sector given that
council tenants enjoyed degrees of subsidisation far above that given to
any other sector of the market. Under the legislation council house rents
would be raised over a number of years until they achieved comparable
rates to the private sector. The poorest council tenants were to be
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protected by a national rent rebate scheme, which replaced the previous
local ad hoc schemes. In addition a set rate fund contribution (RFC) was
made mandatory, and subsidy was only paid on the Housing Revenue
Account’s (HRA) deficit not met by RFCs and rents. HRAs were also
allowed to make a surplus, though if this were to exceed £30 per
dwelling the difference was to be transferred to the Secretary of State.
The intention of the Act was to reduce the government’s financial
commitment to council housing through this subsidy. Indeed in 1972/3
there were savings of £20M in reduced subsidies to HRAs. However, in
the short life of the Act’s operation the Exchequer’s contribution to
housing grew. This can largely be attributed to inflation, and the
persistence of local authorities to continue to build, repair and renovate
their stock. The 50p per week increase in rents were never enough to
compensate for the rising costs associated with these activities, and must
have been the major contributory factor behind the development of HIPs
after 1974. This failure gave added justification to the repeal of the 1972
Act in 1975, to be replaced by the Housing and Rents Subsidies Act of
the same year.
This Act restored local authority autonomy over rent levels and
contributions from the general rate fund. Amongst the five new
subsidies contained within the provisions of the Act it was the ‘capital
costs’ element which was to be the most important new award. Under
this subsidy the Government undertook to pay 66% of all loan charges
on all approved expenditure. Together with the other four subsidy
components (high cost, transitional, cushioning and changeover
subsidies) the 1975 Act represented a return to a system, which
encouraged construction, and awarded subsidy according to the level of
local authority activity. However, this activity incentive was soon
counterbalanced by disincentives and control exerted by the capital
finance system outlined above, which was introduced in the face of
macro-economic constraints. In the light of such developments the 1975
subsidy system seems particularly incongruous. It seems less so
however, if it is seen simply as a stop gap whilst the Housing Policy
Review was carried out. The final report of this review in 1977
advocated a new subsidy system that was incorporated into a new
Housing Bill, whose main provisions were taken up by the
Conservatives in 1979, and adopted as ‘new’ reforms in 1980.
Public sector growth restrained- mixed economy of welfare
By the 1970s local authority housing accounted for nearly a third of the
housing stock, and the proportion continued to rise throughout the
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decade. However, the rate of increase had slowed nearly to a stop before
a real decline set in during the 1980s. Although this can partly be
explained away by the fall in demand for new housing, there were,
nonetheless continued state support for new public housing. The
difference now was that housing associations were beginning to assume
the construction role previously held by local government.
Housing Associations (HA) have a long history which extends
back beyond that of local authorities to the charitable trusts of the
nineteenth century (Power 1987). Before the First World War they had
been the main source of social housing, but the generous subsidies
offered to Local Authorities during the inter-war years rarely extended
to the Trusts, which meant that they were soon eclipsed as providers of
social rented housing. Their growth stagnated until the Housing Act
1961 provided for the financing pilot ‘cost rent’ and ‘co-ownership
societies’ (Holmans 1987). Although these experiments did not last the
test of time the provisions of the 1964 Housing Act proved far more
enduring. It established the Housing Corporation, which was awarded a
£100 millions loan from the Exchequer that would be awarded to
Associations as part of the financial package they needed to build new
homes. However, high interest rates and inflation sabotaged most of the
provisions contained within these two Acts, and the model housing
society envisaged during the 1960s never materialised.
The only way to encourage Associations to build was to devise a
subsidy system that negated the influence of interest rates and inflation
through the sheer weight of resources offered. The 1972 Housing
Association Grant (HAG) was such a system. HAG was a large capital
grant awarded to approved schemes upon their completion. The idea
was that this initial grant would lower the amount of capital borrowed,
avoiding the front loading problem of housing finance, and allowing
associations to charge ‘fair rents’ as set by a Rent Officer (Hills 1991).
Indeed rents played a key role in the process, as they were the initial
component that determined the size of grant awarded. In simple terms
HAG was capital costs minus a residual loan, where the residual loan is
calculated so that servicing the debt equalled the income from fair rents
minus the amount spent on management and maintenance (M&M)
allowances. The grant was designed so that, given these rent levels,
standard M&M allowances, and servicing a residual loan, an Association
would break even in the first year of a new project’s life. Attempts were
made to control costs through the Total Indicative Costs (TIC) system
that represented average land and building costs for particular types of
development. These values varied across the country, mainly in relation
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to land prices. A the system attempted to become more sensitive to local
variations and project type an increasingly complex matrix of values
which were meant to act as a guide to the Grant levels awarded.
One of the potential advantages to Associations was that given the
erosion of the real value of their debt in comparison with inflationary
price and cost rises significant surpluses could be accumulated. The
Labour Government recognised this and moved towards a policy of
claiming these surpluses for themselves. However they were unable to
legislate before their 1979 election defeat and found instead the
Conservative administration implementing the same policy. The result
was the Grant Redemption Fund (GRF) introduced in 1980. Although
payments under this system never amounted to a significant proportion
of total costs or expenditure, it was projected to rise steeply during the
1990s were there to have been no policy change (Hills 1991). Whilst
surpluses on new stock were skimmed off, additional assistance was
given to debt incurred on pre-1974 stock through the Revenue Deficit
Grant.
The HAG system became all the more important in establishing a
mixed economy in the social housing sector given the 1980 reform of the
local authority housing system. Together with greater controls on capital
spending discussed above a new subsidy system was introduced for the
Housing Revenue Account. Although the new subsidy was, in essence
very simple, it was also very different to that which it replaced (Hills
1987). The idea of using a deficit subsidy was first attempted in 1972, but
was not fully implemented until the 1980 Housing Act. The idea was to
construct a notional HRA for each authority, based on “reckonable”
HRA expenditure, and income. The notional deficit was then deemed to
be the subsidy payable on the actual account. Reckonable expenditure
included the government subsidising 100 per cent of loan charges on
capital spending before 1981, 75 per cent of loan charges on capita
spending after 1981, a deduction of 65 per cent of notional loan charges
relating to sales, and a reckonable amount spent on M&M. Management
and maintenance was calculated from annual incremental increases on
the average amount spent per dwelling in each authority during 1980-
81. An element of reckonable expenditure therefore remained tied to
historic spending patterns. In addition to capital charges and M&M
there were also a number of less important items included in the
notional accounts. Reckonable income was similarly taken as mostly
being notional increases to rent levels across an authority’s housing
stock. For most, but not all authorities, there was an initial deficit
between notional income and reckonable expenditure, an amount that
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became their HRA subsidy. Therefore, the calculation of this new
Housing Subsidy consisted of a ‘base amount’ (equal to the total subsidy
paid in the previous year) plus a ‘housing cost differential’ (representing
the increase in total reckonable housing costs the previous year) less the
‘local contribution differential’ (the amount Government expects local
authorities to pay towards housing through raising rent levels or rate
fund contributions).
In addition to the HRA subsidy there was also a rent rebate
subsidy paid to authorities through the Department of Social Security,
and contributions from the general rate fund, which was eligible for
subsidy from the local government Block Grant. Both these systems can
be seen as an advance in terms of the equitable distribution of resource,
yet it was the HRA subsidy that remained the focus of government
policy. The advantage of this system to the Government was that
calculating subsidy based on a notional HRA allowed it to exert a great
deal of control whilst maintaining the impression of local autonomy. In
principle subsidies were reduced on the assumption of rising rent levels,
and authorities could either mirror these increases, substitute the income
with rate fund contributions, or lower spending. In reality cutting the
Housing Subsidy from £1,667M to £464M between 1979/80 and 1987/88
was far too large a decrease to be met solely from rate fund
contributions, and therefore limited the ability of individual council’s to
oppose government policies directed through the subsidy system. Even
if an authority had wanted to take this course of action contributions
from the general fund had become increasingly expensive through
penalties associated to their Block Grant, although the Government
seemed reluctant to use the powers under the 1980 Housing Act to
reduce an authority’s Rate Support Grant. However the systems of
incentives to increase rents or lower M&M spending was dependent
upon authorities receiving a subsidy for doing so. By 1988 the notional
HRAs of less than 90 authorities were eligible for subsidy. The HRA
subsidy was, as an incentive system, becoming redundant.
Local Government behaviour was largely determined by the Block
Grant, whose calculation and allocation formula was reformed in 1980
under the Local Government Act of the same year. The formula that it
replaced had been in operation since 1974 and was based on multiple
regression analysis. The formula was an attempt to move away from
using subjective proxies and weightings for spending needs, and
establish a more sophisticated and accurate means of measuring need.
Cheap computing made this possible for the first time, and although
complicated, regression analysis was believed to be the best way of
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relating past expenditure patterns to social and demographic patterns.
The Government claimed that it was beyond the means of individual
authorities to influence the spending figures used in the formula and,
therefore, alters their future allocation. This did not stop small, lower
spending authorities from levying such accusations. Subsequent reports
on local government finance from the study Team on Expenditure
Needs Assessment (STENA) and the Layfield Committee suggested that
there was some substance to these claims. Regression analysis used on
past expenditure did, beyond the short term, encourage high spending
authorities to spend more.
Labour therefore committed themselves to reforming the system,
but following the 1979 election result the policy was repackaged and
presented as the ‘new’ Conservative Local Government, Planning and
Land Act in 1980. The striking feature of this formula was how closely it
resembled an outline advocated by Lord Balfour in a Royal Commission
Minority Report written in 1903 (Hale and Travers 1993).
The Act reformed the RSG by combining both need and resource
equalisation elements into a single block grant, just as the 1977 Green
paper had proposed. The apparent primary objective of this system was
to restrain local authority spending. This was achieved by comparing an
authority’s actual spending with a centrally assessed figure for
spending-needs (Grant-Related Expenditure Assessment). Control was
exerted by fully compensating for expenditure at or below GREA, and
the threat of penalties if spending rose above these levels (Loughlin
1994). Although councils could initially supplement their income and
raise spending above their GREA additional legislation in 1982 severely
restricted their future ability to raise rates and additional finance
independent of central government (Bennet 1982).
Although some of the key aims of the new system were to make
needs indicators more directly related to services, more intelligible, and
based on common-sense judgement the use of over sixty components
simply made the system more complex. Strong justifications could be
given for each constituent part, but to local authorities the system in its
entirety looked like a sophisticated smoke screen behind which political
manoeuvres could take place.
During this period, when a new government was elected and local
government and housing finance was radically reformed, relatively little
was done to the health system. Major organisational changes had taken
place in 1974, and the RAWP formula was implemented two years later.
The new resource allocation formula presented such a fundamental shift
from its predecessor that many years were to pass before it was felt that
39
its course had been run. The movement of resources away from areas
that were considered over resourced would be gradual and achieved
through varied rates in resource growth. Within the formula based on
Standard Mortality Ratios only peripheral or supplementary alterations
were made. The most important of these was the introduction of the
Market Forces Factor in 1980.
Summary so far – medium term conflict minimisation
Figure 4 below draws together most major changes to funding formulae
in education, health and housing described above and places them
within boundaries set by the stage theory postulated at the beginning.
Although some reforms fit this model better than others it is still a useful
explanatory tool. Broadly speaking the more linear the development
path a service has followed the better it fits our stage theory. This is
explained more clearly in a pictorial representation below (figure 6a-c).
The stage theory is based upon a model that draws upon public
choice theory, and explains behaviour largely in terms of maximising
self-interest in the medium term. Reforms may bring short and long-
term benefits that extend beyond the pure self-interest of various groups
connected with the formulae, yet the hypothesis proposed at the outset
suggested that it should be the overriding or even only explanatory
factor. Having seen that none of our three case study sectors fit the
model perfectly this must suggest that there are other influences on the
course of reform; some of the more influential of which are outlined
below.
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The intellectual genesis driving formulae reform
A revised public choice model similar to the one proposed earlier would
suggest that opportunism and reaction governs the process of
developing needs-based formulae. The narrative outlined above
seemingly confirms this thesis. However, it simultaneously ignores the
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Figure 4: A summary of funding formulae history
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intellectual and moral framework within which politicians, bureaucrats,
academics and public devised policy. In short it explains medium term
political expediency but fails to understand why individuals were
predisposed to choose a certain course of development. Therefore, in
order to appreciate the direction in which funding formulae developed
we are required to understand the intellectual root and moral traditions
from which reform springs.
Following this line of argument establishing equity as the
underline principle for allocation systems was not only politically
advantageous, but also a moral and intellectual necessity. The
framework within which interested parties debated various reforms was
defined by criteria that were first clearly defined around the turn of the
century, but that had existed in an undefined state for far longer.
Broadly speaking this framework consisted of a general perception of
‘fairness/equity and efficiency’. Formulae were justified and tested
according to these criteria. Few, if any, allocation methods have denied
the importance of this framework, and most have warranted their
introduction by claiming that these principles were enhanced by further
reform. It is a notable feature that just as allocation formulae have
developed over time, so too the perception and definition of fairness and
efficiency is dynamic. What follows is a brief outline of how academics
have sought to establish and tie down what these principles mean, and
their subsequent impact on the development of funding formulae.
Predominant amongst those who attempted to define and place on the
political and public agenda the need for equity, as a driving force for
reform was Sidney Webb. Writing an article in 1897 Webb drew up a
theory which he later called, in 1901 ‘a Policy of National Efficiency’,
and later the ‘National Minimum’. All these writings advocated the
moral and economic advantages of ensuring that those with the greatest
need for State services should be the ones to benefit most from public
expenditure. In 1911 the practical outcome of such an ethical, economic
and political stance would mean that,
in the complications of a modern industrial civilisation…a
formation and rigid enforcement in all spheres of social
activity, of a National Minimum below which the individual,
whether he likes it or not, cannot in the interests of the well-
being of the whole, ever be allowed to fall.  It is this policy of
a National Minimum which, in my judgement is going to
inspire and guide and explain the statesmanship and politics
of the twentieth century (Webb 1911).
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In the terminology of the Third Way (as defined in Giddens 1998)
this fulfils many of the criteria that symbolise the classic state of ‘social
democracy’. Nevertheless, many of the implicit assumptions also equate
to notions of neoliberalism. For example it is not at al clear whether
Webb is advocating a cradle-to-grave or safety net welfare state. Indeed
many of his own policy recommendations suggest that he favoured a
cradle-to-grave safety net. In much of his work the preoccupation with
childhood experiences suggest that his definition of equality is similar to
that of opportunity advocated by proponents of the Third Way, rather
than the equality outcome proposed by later left wing intellectuals.
Indeed other themes that have been associated with this alleged new
theory (Giddens 1998: 66) are all common themes in Webb’s work, e.g.
protection of the vulnerable, rights and responsibilities, etc.
Therefore, whereas some politicians and academics hail these
concepts as a new dawn, history suggests that this unique combination
of principles prove to be remarkably similar to the tradition of
nineteenth century Christian Socialism from which the Webbs gleaned
much of their framework (Bryant 1996). If such a concept as the Third
Way does indeed exist perhaps we should attribute much more those
who truly advanced its core values within British Politics. Work by
Owen (Garnett 1972; Owen 1822), Kingsley, and Webb all call out to be
revisited.
The elements Webb combined to form his argument, therefore,
were neither original nor radical. Concerns regarding the efficiency of
‘welfare’ provision, State intervention and the individual productive
capacity had been voiced by Conservative and Tory reformers during
the previous hundred years, and were used to justify measures such as
the Poor Law (e.g. Bentham, Senior, etc.). Similarly writing on equality,
individual rights and needs had also developed into a sophisticated
debate by the end of the nineteenth century (Freeden 1990). What Webb
could claim however was a theory which appealed to a broader cross
section that that of many other writers. Although future articles were to
propose firm policy objectives the principle itself could mean all things
to all men. To the newly enfranchised working class it offered the hope
of radical reform and State intervention on their behalf; to the middle
classes a means of providing the poor with the basic needs deemed, by
consensus, to be necessary, whilst doing so in the most effective and
efficient means possible; whereas to opponents of State intervention the
theory advocated a minimum rather than maximum level of action.
It is easy to underestimate the significance of Webb’s writing,
especially on those who would seem, superficially, at odds with his
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politics. Yet Webb’s principles could seem equally at ease in the Party
that has ruled for the majority of the century; a Conservative Party
which believed in ‘top down’ rule, and (sometimes very) gradual
reform. Balfour, for example, would certainly have been aware of
Webb’s wide appeal and influence having worked with other Fabians to
produce the 1903 Minority Report on Financing Local Government.
Other Balfour sponsored reforms like the 1902 Education Act also fit
neatly into the Webb theory, despite their undoubted political
differences. It would be foolish to attribute too much influence to
Webb’s work on Balfour, given that the latter had attained his own
intellectual maturity before the former views gained pre-eminence.
However, together with an eye for political expediency and a tradition
of Tory paternalism Balfour would certainly have echoed the Fabian
calls for efficiency.
Despite very different opinions on the appropriate scale State
activity, Webb’s concern with maintaining national efficiency at both
corporate and individual level was a guiding force driving many
Conservative reformers. Both Baldwin and Macmillan can be viewed in
such terms. Macmillan in particular was the first in a new breed of
Conservative leaders who accepted, if somewhat grudgingly, the
permanency of universal state provision in health and education, as well
as a significant commitment in social housing. Little could one imagine
many previous party leaders who could state in an election pledge that
his aim would be ‘to redress the grave and social anomalies that are
created by the imbalance between the ‘rich’ south and ‘poor’ north’
(Macmillan 1962).
It was under his administrations that probably the two most
influential modern Conservative intellectual politicians emerged. Iain
Macleod and Enoch Powell’s work was devoted to moulding the
Welfare State into an image more in tune with their Conservative
ideology. However the body of work they produced from the
Conservative Research Department, Policy Study Group and others was
never as radical as proposals form the Institute of Economic Affairs, or
individuals like John Jewkes on health reform. In office, even the more
right wing Powell introduced a more needs sensitive increase in capital
spending on hospitals (A Hospital Plan for England and Wales 1962). Part
of his inability to implement a more radically right wing series of real
term cuts was the popularity of the Health service with the public, and
the growing staff costs and pharmaceuticals bill. It was also the same
administration that initiated a rapid increase in education as well as vast
expenditure on new social housing (Raison 1990).
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Nevertheless, Powell still justified his proposals by stressing that
given inevitable expenditure the Government should undertake its
commitment in the most efficient means possible. From this mutual
position, on which both Macleod and Powell could stand, there was
divergent Conservative opinions. Whereas Macleod increasingly came
to accept the scale and scope of State action Powell never dropped his
theoretical opposition. As a result we could suggest that Macleod
remained embedded in the consensus politics of which the future Heath
Government was a part, whereas Powell provided one of the strands
from which the ‘conviction politics’ of the Thatcher administrations
derive (Jones 1994). Equally important to both strands however are the
development of needs based formulae that can improve the targeting of
public spending.
Prior to the late 1980s most of the century’s periods of radical
reform have been influenced by Labour politics, in which it is far easier
to identify Webb’s influence. What many British socialist thinkers
gleaned from Webb were egalitarian principles, and a belief that every
individual had a right to expect certain needs to be met by themselves, a
community network or by the State. Webb’s theory was viewed by other
socialists as ‘an embryo of the welfare state’ which
comprised a universal minimum standard of life embracing
pensions, unemployment and sickness benefit, the legal
regulation of hours of work, and the public provision of
health, education, and housing, which would afford
protection against sickness and squalor (Shaw 1996).
On an intellectual basis it was the concept of egalitϑ that these
proposals logically assumed which captured the imagination of future
left wing academics. The first of these gained prominence within Labour
policy circles before the end of Webb’s career, and as an influence on
Labour’s principles R. H. Tawney is without parallel (Shaw 1996). By the
1930s he had already drafted one of Labour’s main policy documents,
Labour and the Nation, and founded the strand of intellectualism within
the Party recently referred to as qualitative socialism (Ellison 1994). In
his most influential work, Equality, Tawney sets out ideology and policy,
which draws a great deal from the ethical socialism, which had also
influenced Webb. Tawney devoted a whole section of this work to
arguing that ‘equality of provision is not identity of provision’, and to
adequately meet people’s needs it was important to devote ‘equal care to
ensuring that they [needs] are met in different ways most appropriate to
them’ (Tawney 1964; quoted in Ellison 1994).
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As well as directly influencing politicians from MacDonald to
Gaitskell, Tawney was also defining the debate for the next generation of
left wing academics. Leading this generation was Titmuss, who, in
adopting the justification for universal services was also concerned with
positive discrimination in allocating resources to those most in need.
Titmuss’ first major work, Problems of Social Policy (1950), argued that
resources were misdirected to benefit the already secure middle classes,
rather than the worst off sections of society who depended upon the
State for many of their needs. Many have continued this theme (see Le
Grand 1982), but it was Titmuss who first provided this theme as a
credible argument in favour of more sensitive, non-historic allocation
formulae.
Surrounding Titmuss in the LSE were others who were to take his
work further. Amongst these were Brian Abel-Smith and Bleddyn
Davies. Both have made considerable contributions to developing needs
based allocation systems, with Davies in particular providing one of the
defining works in this history. Although referring mainly to social
services in Social Needs and Resources in Local Services Davies constructed
a critique of contemporary resource allocation and set objectives to
which reform over the next two decades aspired.
Perhaps Titmuss’ most influential student was Peter Townsend.
Townsend held a largely Marxist view of policy based on his idea of a
‘social plan’ that was ‘designed to integrate provision across the full
range of social services with the intention of making welfare provision
the overriding priority of economic policy’. In Social Services for All? –
much like Titmuss nearly two decades earlier – he called for positive
discrimination to combat the historic inequalities within some services,
and in order to meet the greater needs of certain sections of society.
Townsend’s work went on to influence many Labour politicians who,
despite their different ideological stance, were persuaded by the need
for radical change in the way resources were distributed. In
implementing the RAWP proposals in particular recent evidence
suggests that David Owen’s political conviction was particularly
important (Hurst 1997).
Although figures from Tawney through to Townsend all
advocated very different policy proposals all were concerned with issues
that could alleviate poverty and create a more equitable, egalitarian
society. More importantly all the left wing figures noted above were
concerned with how the distribution of public resources perpetuated
inequalities that had, despite the creation of universal services free or
subsidised at the point of delivery, continued to exist. During the late
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1960’s publications by Townsend and Abel-Smith (The Poor and the
Poorest, 1966), and evidence by pressure groups like the Child Poverty
Action Group suggested the divide between rich and poor was
becoming even more entrenched.
Figure 5 attempts to present a schematic outline of the divergent
paths both right and left wing academics and politicians have taken
from Webb’s original theory of a ‘national minimum’. There is no
suggestion that Webb’s work was original, and many of his proposals
echo the ethical and Fabian heritage from which his work drew.
Likewise Balfour’s contribution to the development of allocation
formulae draws on a similar background with the addition of his Tory
ideology. With various influences it is easy to see how Webb’s writings
could begin to mean all things to all men, and how it could provide the
genesis for two very different political/ideological schools of thought.
Both these groups were sustained by different economic theory that is
also represented in the diagram. Whereas Keynsian theory implies
greater intervention by the State, classical economics advocates minimal
intervention. Of course redistribution of resources becomes far easier to
achieve in the former, whilst efficient spending becomes a concern
within the framework of the latter.
Those names placed within boxes are the key figures whose work
has been outlined above, whilst those outside boxes were politicians
influenced by various bodies of work. Little common ground would
seem to cover these individuals, yet most can also be found to have
supported various funding formulae using equity arguments. How
politicians, often standing poles apart could use similar terminology or
ideas to advocate their policies is explained in the lower section of figure
5.
Well before the end of any post-war consensus regarding the
welfare state the problem of creating a fairer distribution of resources
was no longer one of extending provision, but had returned again to the
realm of funding formulae. Within academic circles whose sphere of
influence included leading politicians there was increasing confidence
that current spending often did not correspond to current or future
needs. Furthermore needs could be identified and measured so that a
fairer method of allocating resources could be found. During a period of
resource constraint many on the right also saw this as a better option
than systems which seemed to be spreading resources indiscriminately,
hoping some would hit the most needy. Identifying and allocating
according to need was a means of controlling and making better use of
public resources. To both political wings therefore, the academic
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promises of what funding formulae could deliver seemed increasingly
attractive. Its appeal was exactly that which had made Webb’s theory
successful decades earlier. A needs based equity formula could
seemingly achieve social justice through the redistribution of resources
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Figure 5: Intellectual influences on funding formulae
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and efficient public spending through targeting the most needy. From a
common root back in 1898 divergent political stands had, once again
found a consensus in funding formulae, though for very different
reasons.
This brief history of how academics and politicians have defined
equity is of limited value in itself. Although academic work can have
direct impact (e.g. health formulae since the 1970s) developments
outlined above are of greater importance in representing a wider context
within which politicians, bureaucrats, pressure groups and public
support or oppose allocation systems. Work during the twentieth
century has centred both on designing policy that can be viewed as
becoming more equitable, and on explaining more clearly what equity
means to various groups at different points in time. Perceptions of what
efficiency or equality may mean evolve over time, and equity therefore
becomes a dynamic objective. Nevertheless the need to test and defend
systems on the bias of equity remains. The public’s idea of ‘fairness’ may
change over time; nonetheless they will always demand that funding
formulae allocate ‘fairly’. Often these definitions and defence have
succeeded significant pieces of academic work such as those described
above.
Themes and trends
One consistent objective running throughout the development of British
funding formulae is the Government’s desire to control the behaviour of
the institutions that receive resources. This can be realised in one of two
ways: formal restrictions or incentives.
Incentives that alter or encourage certain responses are intrinsic to
any funding formula. As well as controlling expenditure through formal
restrictions formulae have often set more flexible ceilings by
encouraging frugality. Examples of this would include the ‘classic
British housing formula’ or capitation payments in education. Both paid
a fixed amount per unit, which becomes an incentive for the provider to
perform the service as cheaply as possible. On the other hand percentage
grants, the Addison housing subsidy, or the local government system
introduced in 1974 all encouraged providers to spend as much as
possible in order to increase the size of their award.
Spending is not the Government’s only concern. Funding formulae
have also been used to improve standards and quality of service or to
influence the means and form of provision. In education this meant pre-
war concern over the content of school curricula, quality of teaching
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staff, and exam results. There was real optimism during the nineteenth
century that the education funding formula could replace the need for
inspectors and maintain good standards and results. Health formulae
have proved less ambitious, with politicians feeling less inclined to
define their expected outcomes. In contrast housing systems have been
built upon the belief that the construction cost and quality of a house can
be controlled. Therefore, the Government could allocate subsidies and
capital spending approvals on the basis of plans submitted by
contractors. Similarly formulae have been used as incentives to build
certain types of building, by certain category of builder. The history of
housing finance is a story of the discrimination between private and
public sector landlords who have been willing to respond to payments
or other forms of construction such as the notorious post-war “pre-fabs”.
During the same period health funding encouraged the construction of
large super hospitals rather than small community institutions.
Historically it is apparent that funding formulae have provided a
series of restrictions and incentives that have enabled the Government to
exert a degree of control over the behaviour of lower level institutions
and individuals. These grant structures are used as classic agency tools
in the way Foster et al expects. Response to these controls is distilled
during periods of budget restraint, as institutions’ senses become keen to
the prospect of additional resources. This partly explains the periods of
intense reform to funding formulae, especially during the 1970s. Most of
the exposition for these reforms must remain the desire to achieve an
equitable system, for although control is a highly desirable goal in itself
for central agencies it is far too pessimistic a view to hold alone. The
overt question behind every investigation or reform of the various
systems has been to ask ‘is it fair?’ It must be justified to a wider public
on grounds other than efficiency if it is to carry political persuasion. To
answer the question of whether the new formula is more equitable than
its predecessor goes some way to providing a justification for change.
The more tight the allocation the more convincing the criteria of fairness
must be.
What the term equity has meant in various sectors and professions
at different points in time is not always the same as the definition we
hold today. Even contemporary literature does not hold the term
constant across or within the services. Most current definitions accept
that equity generally means equal access to services to those in equal
need. In housing this has generally meant decent affordable housing. In
health it has been taken to mean that those with equal need of care
(equally ill) should have equal opportunity and access to the same
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standard of care. Education has for the past forty years been part of the
local government sector where equity is defined as a situation in which a
person paying an average amount of council tax should expect a
minimum standard of services. All these policy outcomes clearly echo
Webb’s thesis.
The different sector terminology is a symptom of the distinct
evolution of funding formulae within each service. Figure 5a-c is an
attempt to summarise these developments in each of the three sectors.
The vertical axis represents the relationship between the allocation of
resources and need. The higher the value the greater the degree of
equity involved in the allocation procedure; alternatively, as the value
decreases allocation becomes more random, incremental (i.e. rational
conflict minimising but not needs based) and inequitable. Of course
there can be no objective quantifiable measure, or an upper limit to this
axis, given that equity is itself a subjective concept.
Equity is judged according to its sensitivity in meeting two criteria.
The first of these is ‘institutional needs’. One of the questions early
formula failed to ask was to what extent does the formula take account
of geographical differences in costs? Most modern funding formulae
acknowledge that costs may be greater in one area than another, and
compensates for the different purchasing power of resources. Another
aspect of equity for local government, housing and pre-war health is the
different ability of various communities to supplement central
government resources. Central Government may assume that local
institutions can supplement their income from contributions made by
the surrounding communities. Given the uneven distribution of wealth
some areas find this easier than others, a factor that the formulae must
account for. These spending and cost needs represent the needs of the
institutions and providers.
The second criteria by which equity is measured can be defined
separately as the ‘individual’s needs’. It seems straightforward to state
that there are some people and areas that have greater educational,
health or housing needs than others and consequently they require more
resources than do those living in a better environment or with better
health. It has proven very difficult to find objective variables that can be
accurately measured as an indicator or proxy for individual need. Even
when suitable variables are found they may soon become outdated in
the eyes of an evolving society. It is only when both criteria are fully
fulfilled that an equity of allocation is achieved. What is perfectly
equitable allocation of resources is an impossible question to answer;
though we have noted the features that make some systems more
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equitable than others. The intention of this exercise, therefore, is to show
how certain formulae were more sensitive to need based criteria (both
individual and institutional) than others, and how some proposals were
well in advance of their contemporaries.
Therefore, the higher the value along the vertical axis the more
equitable the distribution of resources. The lines denote the systems in
operation across time, with their equity judged according to the criteria
outlined above. The position of each piece of legislation or report
(marked by the boxes) provides a useful comparison with the actual or
preceding systems. By comparing the horizontal and vertical values of
each we can subjectively claim that some proposals were well before
their time, or that some pieces of legislation enabled a far more equitable
distribution of resources than anything that had gone before.
Due to the historical connection between education and local
government both formulae (merged into one in 1957) have been
included in figure 6a. One of the most striking features of this graph is
the foresight of several reports during the first quarter of the century.
The Balfour Report (BR) and the Webb Report (WR) were both minority
conclusions drawn from Royal Commissions. Although the main reports
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from both Commissions were far from controversial the both the authors
of the alternatives advocated systems that were similar to policies
implemented years afterwards. Lord Balfour’s proposals in particular
resembled the post 1980 methods of allocating resources to local
government, by calculating a notional standard expenditure level, and
adjusting the grant according to an authorities ability to meet this target
(Travers and Hale 1993). Webb’s proposals were less advanced than that
of Balfour, yet still looked ahead to 1944. Two other reports are noted.
Perceived at the time to be a justification behind cutting expenditure the
Geddes report did highlight many of the fundamental flaws in the
percentage grant system, and advocated a form of grant that was not
fully extended to education until the late 1950s. The final non-legislative
event recorded was the Layfield Commission, which investigated local
government finance during the 1970s. Again this has been included for
many of its valid criticisms of the contemporary system rather than
implementation of its proposals.
Most of the formulae introduced by Education Acts (EA) or Local
Government Acts (LGA) were small advances in the cause of equity on
their predecessors. However there are exceptions. The first was the 1929
Local Government Act that saw the introduction of the first block grant.
Although only allocating only a small proportion of expenditure its
significance in reforming the percentage grant system was a highly
significant influence over the development of future systems. Similarly
the 1957 formulae was another major advance on its predecessor. It saw
the merger of education funding into an improved local government
formula. Finally the 1974 formulae is notable, as it is the only recorded
piece of local government legislation that remains below the general
trend line. The reason is that the system of multiple regression did
reward long term high spending through larger grants. Many local
authorities realised this and a perverse incentive to increase spending
arose due to the assumption within the system that spending patterns
identified need. Although the use of multiple regression increased the
technical sophistication of the formula little improvement was achieved
in terms of distinguishing need.
Health funding has been less susceptible to reform than either
education or housing. Prior to 1990 there has only been two pieces of
legislation that have radically affected the allocation of resources to
General Practitioners – the National Insurance Act of 1911 (NI) and the
National Health Service Act of 1946, which established the MPC as
guardians of GP distribution. Since then different pay disputes may
have altered the method and scale of GP remuneration, but has not
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fundamentally altered the distribution of GPs themselves. The first
formal based funding system for secondary health was the 1929 Local
Government Act, which provided resources to local authority
institutions, and former Poor Law infirmaries. Although this system did
not extend across the sector it was a far better in determining need than
the simple incremental increases adopted after 1946, which simply
reinforced historic inequities. The Hospital Plans (HP) of the 1960s were
a small improvement on this, as was the Crossman formula (CF) that
followed. The real development in the allocation of health resources was
the RAWP formula of 1976. In explicitly stating equity as its central
objective it was, in method and theory light years ahead of its
predecessors.
The significant feature for many years in the allocation of housing
subsidies has been the cyclical nature of policy. Local government (LGS)
continued to receive the same form of general nee subsidy for over fifty
years. This was an indiscriminate allocation to almost any authority that
wanted to build homes. Slum clearance policies did go some way to
redirecting resources to the most needy, though again their success was
still linked to an authorities propensity and ability to undertake such
schemes. It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that government
subsidies attempted to negate the effect of historic debt, interest rates
and inflation, and the position of the rent rebate system and Housing
Association Grant signals the advance in equity these policies
represented. Housing subsidies have always had to consider issues of
landlord and tenant equity, and although these policies confronted the
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latter much still remained to be achieved in the allocation between social
landlords.
Although the measurements of equity are, in each case, relative
values it is one of the most notable trends from both the historical
narrative and figures 6a-c that the discussion regarding equity became
far more intense in the years either side of 1970. The gradient of each
trend line rises sharply, well beyond that seen previously. The only
corresponding period of activity was following the economic slumps of
the early and late 1920s. It seems almost paradoxical however to suggest
that the 1970s, which saw two Conservative governments, and the rise of
the new right should contribute so much to the equity agenda of welfare
institutions.
The development of more equity based allocation formulae
during the 1970s and 1980s
It is clear from the narrative above that during the 1970s far greater
pressures were put on resources than ever before. A lid was placed on
spending that was kept down through a combination of economic and
ideological developments (Glennerster and Hills 1998; Timmins 1995).
The effect was an unprecedented drive towards more explicit rationing
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through the funding formulae. If rationing was to be fiercer it had to be
based on some kind of preferably ‘scientific’ or at least agreed criteria.
This was not a trend unique or new to the 1970s, but a continuation and
acceleration of processes that had been at work for decades.
Nevertheless it seems paradoxical that the election of successive right
wing governments during the 1980’s, dedicated to reigning-in spending
on the social wage, implemented and administered formulae that were
unprecedented in their equity driven redistribution of resources. This
question of why Conservative governments should make equity the
guiding principle to resource allocation has not been fully answered in
previous studies. Why should a government that advocates self-
sufficiency, and whose power base remains in the Southeast implement
formulaic changes that could see resources being directed towards
groups and areas that had weak voices and little political advantage to
offer? There are, however, five processes at work during these years that
could in combination explain this paradox.
First, was the simple ability to devise, work and administer
formulae that were more sensitive to need. This was largely due to the
advent of cheap and powerful computing, but also drew on the growing
academic interest in funding mechanisms and equitable allocations that
derived from the work on poverty in the late 1960s.
The second is the timing of the financial crises, the high point of
which occurred under a Labour government. Ideologically and
politically Labour had far more invested in supporting socially deprived
groups and areas than the post-1979 Conservative governments.
According to measurements of need it was the North and the poor who
were losing out through formulae based partly or wholly on historic
spending. These also happened to be Labour’s power-bases. It was in the
party’s interest, therefore, to advocate more equitable systems of
resource allocation. Such alterations then take time to be formulated and
then implemented, so that although it was a Labour government who
instituted the committees and reports that proposed the relevant
changes the consequences of reform were not fully worked out until the
accession of the Conservatives to power. To a lesser extent this had also
happened under the 1970 to 1974 Conservative government and Peter
Walkers’ local government reforms which did not work themselves
through into resource allocation until the following Labour
administration. The first factor behind the paradox of new right and
equity, therefore, is procedural and legislative inertia.
A justifiable criticism to this viewpoint would argue that the areas
that gained from formulae introduced during the 1970s were not
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necessarily poor or Labour. Population was the main driving force in the
health formulae, for example. This meant that many Labour inner city
areas lost out to the growing Conservative suburbs. Additions were
made for high cost areas in the Southeast, and rural areas could also
claim that their costs and needs were higher. Thus ‘need’ turned out to
be a politically adaptable concept capable of appealing to Conservatives
and Labour voters. The inherent political conflicts between members of
the same party, between central and local government, between
government and the professions was very effectively side tracked or
defaced into technical debates about the weightings derived from
various coefficient calculations. These were debates that could be left to
committees of experts.
The third factor is a basic shared belief by politicians across the
political spectrum that the most needy in society must always be
protected. This claim was used to justify reduced but targeted social
security benefits in the 1980s (Evans 1998). So, too, could it be used to
support tight education, health and housing budgets since the mid-
1970s. Politicians were defending their policies by saying “yes budgets
are tight, but we are concentrating them on the most needy”.
Nor does one have to be entirely cynical about this claim as it
proves a perfectly genuine belief in the virtues of equity. Despite the
relative and absolute cuts in expenditure this simplistic sense that had
permeated throughout British society stated that the poorest sections
should not lose out equally to those better off. Rather cuts should be
distributed so that the most needy suffer least.
Principles such as this penetrated the bureaucracy who
administered and implemented the formulae. The Civil Service was
central in the successful implementation of any new method of resource
allocation, and their role can be interpreted in one of three ways.
Politicians would like to believe that the members of the Service are
neutral servants, who are directed by their masters. More likely, they
are, at the very least, individuals who hold and are influenced by the
societal values around them, whilst at the other extreme they are a self-
interested group whose agenda is dominated by the desire to increase
their own power. Formulae of increasing complexity were seemingly
becoming better at allocating resources according to need, but were also
becoming unintelligible to all but those directly involved in creating the
systems. Thus “good-guy”, and “bad-guy” theories of bureaucratic
behaviour, and especially the bureau or regime slapping theories of
Dunleavy (1991) are quite consistent with the development of formula
funding in a period of fiscal restraint.
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The final element, which was at work during this period, was the
existence of a relatively small number of large and powerful local
authorities. Their voice was too powerful and too loud to ignore, and
their historic role in service provision, which extended back to the
nineteenth century, had enabled them to build up historic spending
levels which the Government found hard to cut without facing a severe
battle. The evidence for their success has been illustrated in studies,
which have shown inter-regional differences in the UK to be far smaller
than that apparent in most, if not all of her developed neighbours and
industrial competitors (Bramley 1992). Similarly we could also note the
power and influence of the medical profession as a powerful interest
group representing the whole country.
Summary
Figures 6a to 6c are not meant to represent the final distribution of
resources in each sector, or more importantly to characterise outcomes in
the three services. Rather, it indicates how sensitive to need each system
has become; the precision of needs assessment; the ability of each
formulae to achieve equalisation of need and resources. The progress
charted is relative, both historically within a sector, and between sectors.
Despite recent studies that show the formulae do achieve a
redistribution of resources towards the poor few of the formulae studied
make this an implicit aim. Measurements of deprivation are used as
proxies for education, health or housing need, not as objectives in
themselves.
In addition the equitable distribution that many of these formulae
claim strive can be compromised by a number of further factors. Most
obviously many of those systems studied above are ‘damped’. This
means that a redistribution of resources is weakened by the political
necessity to ensure that no area or region suffers an absolute loss.
Similarly the use of specific grants within each sector can alter the final
allocation picture, just as local elements of local discretion in spending
allocated resources may not equate to the patterns envisaged by the
formulae. Finally, and most importantly there is no judgement made
with regards to a sufficient level of funding. Allocation formulae are
only designed to determine relative need and an equitable distribution
of a fixed pot. Arguments over whether local services receive a ‘fair’
amount of funding often become confused with a universal demand for
more resources. All three of the services studied are to some degree
bottomless pits for additional resources, yet these are totally separate
arguments from most of that which concerns the discussion above.
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Given these qualifications, and further definition of the
measurement of needs assessment it was clear that a great surge of
development took place during the 1970s. Together with economic
constraints that required a greater efficiency and effectiveness in public
expenditure much of this advance can be explained in terms of
increasing technical ability. The ability to devise and administer complex
formulae was a necessity for the developments that took place, and
together with the economic/political influences and the intellectual
work that created the framework for this process technical progress was
essential in the design of these formulae. It was noted that many of the
principles and models for recent formulae had in fact been proposed
years earlier, but it had simply been technically impossible to
implement. Funding formulae have almost without fail managed to
remain beyond the comprehension and understanding of most non-
specialists, the clearest example of which are the formulae implemented
over the last two decades. Quantitative research, analysis and
explanations derived from the advent of cheap computing have
accelerated the evolution of systems that have historically pushed the
practical implementation of relevant theory and technology as far as
possible. Whether this confirms the public choice model of empire
building civil servants is ambiguous, and suggests that it should be
considered as an explanatory variable on its own.
Conclusion
In short the historic evidence reveals a more complex picture than the
simple public choice based model we ventured at the beginning, but it
does hold in its essence. During the 1970s a greater academic awareness
of the problems, more research and data, as well as an ability to process
this data following the advent of cheap powerful computing allowed
formulae to become far more refined, sensitive, and complex. More
complex need based formula both appealed to some basic normative
values that become attached to social service provision, and helped
reduce political conflict in a period of resource constraint, and increased
the power of the central bureaucracy.
Yet we must also remember that reforms during the 1970s and
1980s drew upon an intellectual heritage that extends back over a
century of political and ethical thought. This history has proposed
changes that were only practical years later following technical advances
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that introduced better data and calculating power. Clearly there are
short, medium, and long term influences on the formulae (figure 7).
Furthermore these influences are dynamic over time and can be
represented as concentric squares growing or contracting over the
period of our study (figure 8). Academic work on equity and needs has
largely defined the principled framework in which change takes place.
Formulae outside these boundaries would be very unlikely given the
lack of moral or academic justification.
TIME SCALE EXPLANATORY
THEORY
OUTCOME
Long-term Principled/
moral
predisposition
A general societal belief in
fairness; generally defined as
those in equal need receiving
equal resources.
Medium-term Political
expediency
explained
through public
choice theory.
Devolved formulae the
objectives of which everybody
agrees upon. Minimisation of
political conflict.
Short-term Practical ability The simple ability to collect
enough data and process it in
such a way as to make it useful
as a tool for assessing measuring
and allocating resources
according to need.
Figure 7: Factors that influence the development of funding
formulae
Figure 8 suggests that this area may have contracted over the
period of our study as the definition of equity is refined and information
regarding need grows. Equity in health resource allocation, for example,
was unambiguously defined in the 1976 RAWP report, and subsequent
formulae are tested against its standards. Previously the lack of such a
definition led to a lack of clarity regarding the meaning of equity, and,
more importantly for formulae, how this could be achieved. Although
definitions and ideals are less clear in the other two sectors additional
research and often greater public awareness that follows place
constraints on what various groups accept as a fair allocative formula.
This implicitly assumes that more restrictions are placed on new
60
proposals. Formulae have to prove themselves more equitable and
academically more rigorous than their predecessors.
The inner area represents technical ability. This certainly increased
over the last hundred years. Only through more information, more
research and better computing could the complex formulae of the 1970s
and 1980s become practical to administer. As the ability to implement
and administer more complex formulae becomes a reality the inner area
increases. The historical study suggests that for most of the century
progress in this field has been consistent and gradual. Technical
developments for example often act as pull factors on allocation systems.
New information and knowledge can pull reform along by highlighting
the weaknesses of existing formulae or illuminating the possibilities of
new methods.
Exceptions to this gradual process have been noted in both the
narrative and figure 6, when reforms are accelerated. These periods tend
to follow or mirror times of economic crises- most strikingly during the
late 1920s and 1970s. The implementation of more complex formulae
during these periods certainly had political influences as well, that can
be explained through a revised form of public choice theory. This
Principled
Predisposition
Political
Expediency
Practical
Ability
Figure 8: The dynamics of long, medium and
short term influences on funding formulae
61
remains the core explanatory proposition, even though intellectual
studies defined the principled disposition of policy makers and public,
and technical developments restricted complexity and scope. Devising,
implementing and justifying formulae is an intensely political process,
and it is a force that runs through this entire history.
Electors, bureaucrats and politicians are all self-interested groups.
Agreement on equity as an agenda for resource allocation systems may
have appealed to such individuals. Yet many of these players also have
motivations or constraints outside their own self interest, and to suggest
that all is a political compromise may bee an over pessimistic world
view, just as an argument proposing equity as the sole objective of
funding formulae is too optimistic. Yet the strength of a diluted public
choice theory, and the consistency of equity as a theme within the
development of allocative systems is undeniable.
Realistic policy choices, therefore, lie along the area where short,
medium and long-term factors overlap (as defined in figure 7). Formulae
that are described above are always an agreement between various
claims and take account of public perception or technical constraints.
Systems that have not often run into early difficulty and rarely survive
for long. Studying the history of funding formulae these examples are
notable by their absence, and the agreement and continuity between
formulae within each sector is striking. This would seemingly support
the claim of this paper that a model that accounts for and explains
historic choices can explain the development of resource allocation
systems.
Funding formulae have travelled a long journey over the last
century. Different systems have all been steered by clear principles of
equity, though additional goals of efficiency, economy and control may
also have been introduced over time. The fuel for this development has
been provided by research, understanding and greater technical ability,
but driving the whole system was the engine of politics. Funding
formulae have been used to produce equitable allocations of resources,
and yet they have achieved far more. Different sectional interests have
often been appeased by reforms to formulae. Conflict between groups
both inside and outside the central process is minimised by using the
latest statistical techniques and knowledge to create more sensitive
needs-related formulae that appear equitable, politically acceptable and
academically rigorous. Now, what more could one ask of a formula?
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